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ARTICLE
CLASS ACTION-BARRING MANDATORY
PRE-DISPUTE CONSUMER ARBITRATION
CLAUSES: AN EXAMPLE OF (AND
OPPORTUNITY FOR) DISPUTE
SYSTEM DESIGN?
NANCY A. WELSH*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of dispute resolution, there has been significant controversy
over the mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses that organizations im-
pose upon consumers, patients, nursing home residents, clients, employees,
and others.  The controversy has intensified with the addition of class action
waivers and the Supreme Court’s repeated enforcement of such clauses—
even in the face of state and federal legislation designed to guarantee that
less-powerful parties have access to redress in the courts.1  More recently,
opponents of the clauses have worked to increase public awareness by coin-
ing the term “forced arbitration,” and they have distributed a video that
focuses on the clauses’ negative impact on two individuals and a restaurant
owner.2 Consumer Reports has joined in, warning consumers against
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts for goods or ser-
vices.3  The New York Times has even run a series detailing the effects of
* William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson
Law; Chair of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution.  I thank Lisa Amsler (formerly Bingham),
Erin Archerd, Timothy Hoy, and Victor Quintanilla for their comments on an earlier draft, Profes-
sor Mariana Hernandez-Crespo for inviting me to participate in the symposium, and Hanna Bor-
silli and the law review’s student editors for their assistance.  Any errors are my own.
1. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013).
2. Lost in the Fine Print 2014, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-
monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print.
3. Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many Consumer Contracts: And the
Consumer Rights You’re Giving Away as a Result, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerre-
ports.org/cro/shopping/the-arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts (last updated
Sept. 29, 2015).
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mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in particular cases4 and has de-
voted an editorial to the issue.5
All of these efforts appear designed to increase the “salience” of forced
arbitration and class action waivers, especially for consumers.  Interest-
ingly, this is exactly the strategy that was suggested by Judge William H.
Pauley III in his ninety-one-page opinion and order in Ross v. Am. Express,6
a case involving credit card-issuing banks’ alleged violation of federal anti-
trust laws.  Based on evidence admitted at trial, Judge Pauley’s opinion de-
scribed a complicated series of group meetings, email exchanges, telephone
calls, in-person conversations, and other events that culminated in most
credit card issuers’ inclusion of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses
and class action waivers in their contracts with consumers.  Despite the
events and relationships detailed in his opinion, however, Judge Pauley
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden in proving that
the many meetings, conversations, creation of working groups, and other
events amounted to anti-competitive collusion.7  In part, his holding was
4. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=1.
5. Beware the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/
27/opinion/27sun2.html.
6. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 79
(2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the district court’s finding that issuing banks did not engage in anti-
trust conspiracy was not clearly erroneous). See Nancy A. Welsh & Stephan J. Ware, Ross et al. v.
American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring Arbitration
Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18 (2014). After the plaintiffs’ claims
in Ross survived a motion to dismiss, Professor Myriam Gilles wrote:
The development of collective action waivers was also aided by a brain trust of lawyers
and business executives in the credit card industry. In a class action complaint filed in
August 2005 against the major U.S. card-issuing banks, plaintiffs allege that defendants
held a series of high-level, top-secret meetings beginning in 1998 to discuss the imposi-
tion and use of collective action waivers. Towards those ends, plaintiffs allege the de-
fendants formed internal organizations “devoted to collectively promoting and
implementing” these waivers by filing “amicus curiae briefs for the purpose of persuad-
ing courts to enforce onerous and one-sided arbitration clauses,” and “filing countersuits
against class action lawyers and suits for abuse of process,” among other activities.
According to the complaint, the defendant banks—normally cut-throat and fierce com-
petitors—in this instance illegally colluded to fix material terms offered to cardholders.
The plaintiffs’ allegations of defendants’ numerous clandestine meetings and other com-
munications, which have withstood a motion to dismiss, tell a fascinating story of an
entire industry conspiring to avoid class action exposure by working together on draft-
ing, implementing, and defending collective action waivers. And for our purposes here,
the plaintiffs’ story foreshadows the lengths to which corporate defendants are willing to
go to implement these waivers and defend them against legal challenge.
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (2005). Query whether the complaint in Ross would
survive a motion to dismiss today, post-Twombly and Iqbal. See Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have
Been a Contender: Summary Jury Trial As a Means to Overcome Iqbal’s Negative Effects Upon
Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1149 (2010).
7. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (observing that due to high barriers to entry, the credit
card market is a oligopolistic market, which is “characterized by mutually independent behavior
among firms, meaning that what is optimal for a firm depends on the conduct of the firm’s com-
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due to the plaintiffs’ failure to prove that the presence or absence of a class
action-barring arbitration clause was sufficiently “salient” to consumers in
deciding among credit card issuers.  Without such salience, there could be
no anti-competitive effect and thus no violation of the Sherman Act.8  Judge
Pauley acknowledged, however, that the salience of a term may emerge
over time “as a result of competition among sellers or consumer organiza-
tions’ education of consumers.”9
Judge Pauley also concluded that while there was an agreement among
the credit card issuers to make mandatory pre-dispute class action-barring
arbitration the industry norm, this did not constitute an advance and collu-
sive agreement among them to adopt and maintain class action-barring arbi-
tration clauses.  Instead, Judge Pauley found that after twenty-eight
meetings and sidebar conversations,10 the defendant banks had been suffi-
ciently educated about the dangers of class action, the benefits of class ac-
tion-barring arbitration, and the drafting of arbitration clauses that they
could have chosen to adopt class action-barring arbitration clauses as a mat-
ter of “sequential conscious parallelism.”  If that was the case, there need
petitors” and that “if the clauses were adopted independently, there is no injury ‘of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent’”). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). At least the plaintiffs in Ross got to trial, with access to the expressive power of the
courts—unlike the plaintiffs in Twombly.
8. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431 (“During the period of the alleged conspir-
acy. . .arbitration clauses were not salient to consumers.  Salience describes the prominence to
consumers of various aspects of a multidimensional product. . .Those product aspects which are
visible or meaningful to consumers are ‘salient.’. . .Generally, firms are expected to compete as to
salient terms, but not as to non-salient terms.”).  But perhaps the presence or absence of arbitration
clauses, especially class action-barring clauses, is increasing in salience. See, e.g., Lost in the Fine
Print 2014, supra note 2; Beware the Fine Print, supra note 5; Walker, supra note 3. Indeed,
Judge Pauley acknowledged that the salience of a term may emerge over time. See Ross, 35 F.
Supp. 3d at 431–32  (describing signs of the “incipient salience” of class action-barring arbitration
clauses and noting that “[e]xamples of emerging salience abound in other consumer contracts” and
that terms can become salient to consumers as a result of competition among sellers or consumer
organizations’ education of consumers. Judge Pauley also noted that “[c]ollusion can delay the
rise of salience of product features that would normally become salient under competitive condi-
tions.”). See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employ-
ment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012) (urging that consumer organizations
rate the fairness of companies’ arbitration programs and that consumer companies compete for
high rankings).
9. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431–32 (describing signs of the “incipient salience” of class
action-barring arbitration clauses and noting that “[e]xamples of emerging salience abound in
other consumer contracts” and that terms can become salient to consumers as a result of competi-
tion among sellers or consumer organizations’ education of consumers). See also Stipanowich,
supra note 8.
10. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 446–47. The Court acknowledged that First USA had adopted
its clause more than a year before the first meeting of the Issuing Banks and that after the last
Bank adopted a class action-barring clause, “the multi-year pattern of meeting nearly bimonthly
dropped off” and “the Arbitration Coalition did not meet again for almost a year, and after two
follow-up conference calls, appeared to have disbanded.” Id.
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not be an advance agreement among the competitors.11  Judge Pauley added
that the plaintiffs had not identified additional circumstantial evidence that
was sufficient for him to “exclude the possibility that the alleged conspira-
tors acted independently.”12  Indeed, Judge Pauley determined that when
the credit card issuers came together or communicated, they had acted more
like an ad hoc trade association than a group of conspirators (even though
some of the meetings of this alleged trade association were quite exclusive
and limited to the in-house counsel of the interested companies).13
Thus, the defendants won, and the plaintiffs lost, in Ross v. Am. Ex-
press Co.  The Second Circuit has since affirmed Judge Pauley’s judg-
ment.14  But Judge Pauley concluded his opinion with words of warning
directed to the credit card issuers and the lawyers (both outside counsel and
inside counsel) who played key roles in the events leading to the wide-
spread adoption of class action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses:
These actions are the latest installment in multidistrict litigation
that spanned more than a decade and raised a spate of novel is-
sues. They offer a cautionary lesson to all lawyers who labor
under inexorable pressure to generate new business.  When
outside counsel convene meetings of competitors in the hope of
propelling themselves to the forefront of an emerging trend—in
this case, class-action-barring consumer arbitration agreements—
they do so at their professional peril.
When the first meeting convened, only two defendants had class-
action barring arbitration clauses in their card member agree-
ments. By the time the last meeting concluded, all ten of the Issu-
ing Banks, accounting for approximately 87% of all credit card
transactions in the United States, had adopted class-action-barring
arbitration clauses in their card member agreements. It was only
by a slender reed that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the law-
yers who organized these meetings had spawned a Sherman Act
conspiracy among their clients.
11. Id. at 451.
12. See id. at 444 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 588 (1986)).
13. Further examination of these aspects of the opinion, focusing on the law of antitrust, will
have to wait for another day.  For now, however, it is worth noting that in plaintiffs’ appellate
brief, they argued that Judge Pauley was wrong in requiring them “‘dispel’ the possibility of
independent action to prove an antitrust violation[,]” and they urged instead that the existence of a
conspiracy was required to be only a “‘reasonable inference that the [factfinder] could draw from
that evidence; it need not be the sole inference.’” Brief for Appellant and Special App. at 50,
58–59, Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing to In re Publ’n Paper
Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2012)). Plaintiffs also pointed out that courts have found
collusion arising out of trade association activities. Id. at 76–77.
14. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that district court’s
finding that issuing banks did not engage in antitrust conspiracy was not clearly erroneous).
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In retrospect, the Issuing Banks’ short-term goal of lowering liti-
gation costs eluded them. Undoubtedly, retaining some of the
most esteemed antitrust lawyers in the nation to counter the ex-
traordinary talents of Plaintiffs’ counsel imposed a significant
burden on the Issuing Banks. Only the passage of time will reveal
whether the Issuing Banks’ longer-term goal of avoiding the ex-
pense of class action lawsuits can be achieved.15
Judge Pauley’s observations warn of the danger of cooperative efforts
in pursuit of an innovation that will assist an industry, at least when such
cooperation involves companies that are supposed to be in competition with
each other.
But exactly what did these lawyers, companies and others do?  Most
important for the purposes of this essay and symposium, could the actions
detailed in Judge Pauley’s opinion constitute a form of “dispute system de-
sign?”16  If yes, who were the designers?  What were the roles of the dis-
pute resolution professionals and organizations that were involved?  And in
the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) pro-
posed regulation of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses in
contracts for financial services and products, is there another opportunity
for dispute system design?  If yes, where should dispute resolution organi-
zations and individual dispute resolution professionals fit today in any such
design process?
Ultimately, this essay will conclude that a private, ad hoc dispute sys-
tem design process did lead to the insertion of class action waivers in
mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses.  In-house and outside
counsel certainly played key roles in initiating this process, but it is unclear
that any individual lawyers could claim credit or responsibility as “design-
ers.”  The representatives of dispute resolution organizations, meanwhile,
played supporting roles—as providers of information and as amici in Su-
preme Court litigation.  The essay will consider whether dispute resolution
professionals could have managed their role in the process differently—and
if so, why they would have managed it differently.
This essay also concludes that the momentum generated by the
CFPB’s regulatory proposals has created another opportunity for dispute
resolution organizations and professionals to play a role in designing a sys-
tem for the resolution of disputes between consumers and businesses.
However, the appropriate role played by these dispute resolution organiza-
tions and professionals depends upon the role played by the CFPB, particu-
larly in light of the recent election.  If the CFPB survives and acts as a third
party, committed to hearing and considering the concerns of all stakehold-
15. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 457.
16. Professor Lisa Amsler has answered this question in the affirmative. See generally, Lisa
B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004).
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ers and acting in the public interest, and if the agency retains its indepen-
dence and final decision-making authority over the dispute system’s design,
then experienced dispute resolution organizations and professionals should
be able to play a very valuable dual role as both designers and stakeholders.
If the CFPB does not survive or does not retain its independence and deci-
sion-making authority, then playing a dual role becomes more problematic.
It will then be important to identify those dispute resolution organizations
that either do not rely on referrals from corporate repeat players for their
survival or those that do rely on such referrals but have nonetheless per-
sisted in working to protect the integrity of the dispute resolution field.
These are the organizations that will need to step up and play a design role
for the benefit of the dispute resolution field and, even more importantly,
for the benefit of our public justice system and our larger polity.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
The field of dispute resolution generally credits William Ury, Jeanne
Brett, and Stephen Goldberg with introducing “dispute system design”
(“DSD”) in their 1988 book Getting Disputes Resolved.17  In particular,
Ury, Brett, and Goldberg focused attention on power, rights, and interests as
the primary underlying “levers” that organizations can use to resolve con-
flicts.  While working as consultants for a coal mine, the co-authors learned
that the union contract provided for a tiered four-step grievance procedure
(i.e., two negotiation steps at the local level; negotiation at the district level;
and finally binding arbitration).  However, little negotiation actually oc-
curred at the local level, and the miners distrusted arbitration.18  Strikes,
violence, and theft occurred regularly.  Ury, Brett, and Goldberg worked
with union and management officials to encourage them to focus their ne-
gotiations on the interests underlying their positions rather than their posi-
tions or contractual (i.e., legal) grievances.  The focus on interests worked.
Strikes, violence, and theft declined while productivity increased.  Else-
where in the coal industry, Goldberg inserted mediation between negotia-
tion and arbitration, with the hope that mediators’ involvement would
encourage the parties’ disclosure of the problems (or interests) underlying
their grievances.  In addition, Goldberg worked with the parties to motivate
them to use the new dispute resolution system and provided them with the
17. WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RE-
SOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988). Of course, “dispute system
design” builds on others’ earlier work, including the work of Mary Parker Follett, Mary Rowe and
Elinor Ostrom. See Lisa Blomgren Amsler et al., Dispute Systems Design: Preventing, Managing
and Resolving Conflict (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
18. See Jeanne M. Brett et al., Designing Systems for Resolving Disputes in Organizations,
45 AM. PSYCHOL. 162, 162 (1990).
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necessary negotiation skills and resources to increase their likelihood of
success.19  This experiment also worked.20
Based on these experiences, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg concluded that
“resolving disputes on the basis of interests rather than rights or power re-
sults in lower costs and greater benefits.”21  They then developed the fol-
lowing six principles of DSD for disputes within and between
organizations: (1) consult before disputes erupt and solicit feedback after a
dispute has occurred; (2) put the focus on interests; (3) build in “loop-
backs” to negotiation; (4) provide low-cost rights and power procedures; (5)
arrange procedures in a low-to-high cost sequence; and (6) provide dispu-
tants with the necessary negotiation skills, resources, and motivation.22
A few years later, in their 1996 book Designing Conflict Management
Systems,23 Cathy Costantino and Christina Sickles-Merchant focused on the
creation of dispute resolution methods that would be responsive to organi-
zations’ needs and could be implemented before conflicts ripened.  Costan-
tino and Sickles-Merchant categorized the array of dispute resolution
processes as (1) preventative (e.g., dispute resolution clauses, partnering,
consensus building), (2) negotiated, (3) facilitated (e.g., mediation, concilia-
tion,24 institutional ombuds), (4) fact-finding (e.g., neutral experts, masters),
(5) advisory (e.g., early neutral evaluation, non-binding arbitration), or (6)
imposed (e.g., binding arbitration).25  Their DSD principles overlap in some
respects with those that Ury, Brett, and Goldberg introduced, but Costantino
and Sickles-Merchant also provided for more explicit customization and
party self-determination.  Their principles for DSD are: (1) develop guide-
lines for whether ADR is appropriate; (2) tailor the ADR process to the
particular problem; (3) build in preventative methods of ADR; (4) make
sure that disputants have the necessary knowledge and skill to choose and
use ADR; (5) create ADR systems that are simple to use, easy to access,
and resolve disputes early, at the lowest organizational level, with the least
19. Id. at 163.
20. Id. at 162.
21. Id. at 163.
22. Id. at 165–68. URY ET AL., supra note 17, at 42.
23. CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MAN-
AGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
24. Confusingly, “conciliation” is often described as a facilitated process but in reality, it
often appears to operate much like the advisory process of nonbinding arbitration. See Jeswald W.
Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute
Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 173 (2007).
25. Today’s ADR procedures do not fit as neatly as they once did into the categories identi-
fied by Costantino and Merchant. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Collaborative Governance:
Emerging Practices and the Incomplete Legal Framework for Public and Stakeholder Voice, 2009
J. DISP. RESOL. 269, 291 (2009) (explaining that processes for resolving conflict in policy-making
vary along several dimensions, including the participants, their authority and power to influence
policy decisions, and the process for communication and decision-making).
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bureaucracy; and (6) allow disputants to retain maximum control over the
choice of ADR method and selection of neutral wherever possible.26
In their 2013 book, Designing Systems and Processes for Managing
Disputes,27 Nancy Rogers, Bob Bordone, Frank Sander, and Craig McEwen
carefully acknowledged the concerns that had arisen regarding DSD.  For
example, if DSD principles focus on the disputants’ private interests only
and exclude consideration of public interests, the courts’ and litigation’s
potential as a “public good”28 may be undervalued or ignored entirely.  In
addition, some critics have pointed out that although sustained conflict can
be painful for individuals and organizations, it may need to be allowed to
build in order to create the conditions required to motivate social or politi-
cal action.29  Rather than creating new principles for DSD, Rogers and her
colleagues chose to highlight the steps required: (1) taking the design initia-
tive; (2) assessing or diagnosing the current situation (including assessing
stakeholders, their goals and interests, and contexts); (3) creating the sys-
tems or processes; and (4) implementing the design, including evaluation
and process or system modification.  The first and last steps—particularly,
identifying the decision to take the initiative as a step and making evalua-
tion and modification part of the implementation process rather than “add-
ons”—are especially noteworthy.  The co-authors also identified key plan-
ning issues that could arise throughout the process: (1) planning how to
select, engage, and prepare intervenors and parties; (2) determining the ex-
tent of confidentiality and openness in the process; (3) dealing with desires
for change, justice, accountability, understanding, safety, and reconcilia-
tion; (4) enhancing relationships; and (5) incorporating technology.
Most recently, Lisa Amsler, Janet Martinez, and Stephanie Smith30
have weighed in with the following guiding principles for DSD: (1) create a
DSD that is fair and just; (2) consider efficiency for the institution and
participants; (3) engage stakeholders—including users31—in design and
26.  COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS supra note
23, at 120–21. See also DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORK-
PLACE CONFLICT (2003) (including case studies regarding systems for dispute resolution at Brown
and Root, Kaufman and Broad, Warner Brothers, Universal-Studios, Kaiser Permanente, the
United States Postal Service, Johnson & Johnson, Shell, and Prudential, among others).
27. NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DIS-
PUTES (2013).
28. Id. at 12–13.
29. Id. at 15. See also Howard Gadlin, Bargaining in the Shadow of Management: Integrated
Conflict Management Systems, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 371 (Michael L. Mof-
fit & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005); Howard Gadlin, Addressing the Thornier Complexities of
Racial Discrimination Complaints in the Workplace, 15 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 25, 26 (2009).
30. Amsler et al., supra note 17. See also Stephanie Smith & Jan Martinez, An Analytic
Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009); Jill I. Gross,
Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of Twenty-First Cen-
tury Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111 (Fall 2015).
31. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment
Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2009)
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implementation; (4) consider and seek prevention; (5) provide multiple and
appropriate rights-based and interest-based process options; (6) assure users
of flexibility in choice and sequence of process options;32 (7) match the
design to the available resources, including training; and (8) make the DSD
accountable through transparency and evaluation,33 with appropriate con-
cern for privacy, in order to improve it continuously.34  As before, there is
significant overlap with the principles developed by others, but the co-au-
thors’ explicit acknowledgement of the importance of fairness, justice, and
transparency as well as their explicit inclusion of users in the design, imple-
mentation, and evaluation phases represent additional significant steps for-
ward in DSD.35
As Andrea Schneider and I have concluded elsewhere, dispute system
design experts now agree that:
. . .the best systems are characterized by: (1) multiple process
options for parties, including rights-based and interest-based
processes; (2) ability for parties to “loop back” and “loop for-
ward” among these options; (3) substantial stakeholder involve-
ment in the system’s design . . . ; (4) participation that is
voluntary, confidential, and assisted by impartial third party neu-
trals; (5) system transparency and accountability; and (6) educa-
tion and training of stakeholders on the use of available process
options.36
(expressing significant concern about the perceived unfairness of dispute systems designed by one
disputing party and imposed upon the other, often less-powerful disputing parties).
32. This element is consistent with the arguments of commentators who have promoted ac-
ceptance of “process pluralism.” See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on
the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 554–56 (2006); John Lande,
Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 137, 147–50 (2000).
33. See Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employment Dispute Resolu-
tion: Mediation in the Workplace, supra note 31 at 32–33 (describing the evaluation of the USPS
REDRESS system based on users’ perceptions of interactional justice (satisfaction with interper-
sonal treatment experienced during mediation), procedural justice (satisfaction with the process),
and distributive justice (satisfaction with the outcome)); Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let’s
Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101,
115 (2002) (observing that USPS established percentage goals for voluntary employee participa-
tion which substantially influenced the design of the REDRESS program).
34. Amsler et al., supra note 17.
35. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systematic Ethics Issues in Dispute System
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and Domestic
Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 229–30 (2009) (suggesting the following principles for the
“well-meaning process designer—do no harm; do not become a ‘tool’; be sure that the end
users . . . have had input into the design; take some responsibility for implementation and evalua-
tion; know what participants’ legal rights are; avoid systematic discrimination or harm to particu-
lar individuals; consider whether processes should include multiple choices, menus, gateways or
tiers . . . ; ensure that any process designed can be adequately explained; [and] suggest that any
system designed should be evaluated and revised as conditions change”).
36. Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation
into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 74, 93 (2013).
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There also are some principles, though, that are not common among
the DSD experts.  Two are most important for this essay.  First, Costantino
and Sickles-Merchant specifically urge the development of guidelines re-
garding whether ADR is appropriate.  Thus, they recognize that ADR may
not always be appropriate.  This recognition is less obvious in the writings
of some others.  Second, Amsler, Martinez, and Smith are alone in making
the dispute system designer responsible for developing a system that is fair
and just.  Presumably, if the dispute system designer is not satisfied that the
system is sufficiently fair and just, Amsler, Martinez, and Smith would urge
that the designer should withdraw and avoid putting his or her stamp of
approval upon the dispute system.  Rogers and her colleagues also acknowl-
edge that a dispute system designer must deal with the desire for justice, but
they point out that the designer’s sense of justice may conflict with that of
the community within which the system will exist.37  Currently, there is no
code of ethics for a designer facing this dilemma.  Thus, she will need to
rely on the other professional codes that bind her, as well as her own per-
sonal sense of integrity.38
In addition to defining the principles that should guide DSD, Amsler,
Martinez, and Smith have created a structural framework to assist the analy-
sis required in designing a dispute system.  Their chart, below, lists key
questions that should be asked in the DSD process.
1. Goals
a. What do the system’s decision-makers seek to accomplish?
b. Which types of conflicts does the system seek to address?
2. Stakeholders
a. Who are the stakeholders?
b. What is their relative power?
c. What are their interests, and how are their interests repre-
sented in the system?
3. Context and Culture
a. How does the context of the dispute system design affect its
viability and success?
37. ROGERS ET AL., supra note 27, at 79.  Rogers and her co-authors are careful to acknowl-
edge that a designer may face ethical dilemmas.  For example, a client may hope to set up a
“dispute resolution system that leans the client’s way.”  The designer may counsel the client to
consider whether such a system will be sustainable or whether it could ultimately harm the client’s
reputation in the broader community.  Rogers and her colleagues ask, “But, if you fail to dissuade
the client or the client prefers the gain, even if short-term, you face a dilemma.  Do you design the
uneven playing field, ignore the directives of the client and design a more power-equalizing sys-
tem, resign as designer, or take some other action?” Id.
38. Id. See Tricia S. Jones, Designing Systems and Processes for Managing Disputes by
Nancy Rogers, Robert Bordone, Frank Sander, and Craig McEwen, 20 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 34
(2013) (observing that “[i]t is not enough to know that design can be done; it is important to
justify why it is being done and with what results”).
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b. What aspects of culture (organizational, social, national, or
other) affect the workings of the system?
c. What are the norms for communication and conflict
management?
4. Processes and Structure
a. Which processes are used to prevent, manage, and resolve
disputes?
b. If there is more than one process, are they linked or
integrated?
c. What are the incentives and disincentives for using the
system?
d. What is the system’s interaction with the formal legal system?
5. Resources
a. What financial resources support the system?
b. What human resources support the system?
6. Success, Accountability, and Learning
a. How transparent is the system?
b. Does the system include monitoring, learning, and evaluation
components?
c. Is the system successful?39
This essay will return to the DSD principles described supra and will
use the framework developed by Amsler, Martinez, and Smith to assist
analysis.  At this point, however, the essay will turn to the rise of class
action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the general
credit card market in order to determine whether credit card issuers’ devel-
opment and gradual inclusion of such clauses represent an example of DSD.
III. THE RISE OF CLASS ACTION-BARRING MANDATORY
PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES
A. Ross, et al. v. American Express Company, et al.
In 2014, a federal district court in the Southern District of New York
conducted a trial and issued a decision in Ross v. Am. Express Co.,40 a case
involving allegations that a group of credit card-issuing banks had violated
federal antitrust laws as they adopted class action-barring mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration clauses.  As noted supra, Judge Pauley wrote a ninety-
one-page opinion filled with the details of meetings, the development of
inter-related work groups (i.e., the “Arbitration Coalition,” the “Consumer
Companies Class Action Working Group” and the “In-House Working
Group”), email exchanges, telephone calls, in-person conversations, and
39. Lisa Blomgren Amsler et al., Christina Merchant and the State of Dispute System De-
sign, 33 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. S7, S18–19 (2015).
40.  Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d 407.
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other events that culminated in all of the defendant banks’ (and many other
credit card issuers’) inclusion of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses
and class action waivers in their contracts with consumers.41  Importantly,
these issuers dominated the general purpose credit card market, collectively
controlling over 80% of the market share.42
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the events included in Judge Pauley’s opinion
describe the participation of representatives of both credit card-issuing
banks and companies providing consumer products and services.  Also in
the picture were a few public relations firms and even a law professor.
Conspicuously absent are consumers, consumer advocates, or representa-
tives of consumer protection agencies.  For purposes of this essay’s focus
on DSD, however, it is most important to note the roles played by lawyers
and representatives of dispute resolution organizations.
According to Judge Pauley, lawyers were key players in the events that
led to widespread adoption of class action-barring mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses.  Outside counsel actually initiated the first meetings fo-
cusing on the potential inclusion of such clauses, apparently due to pressure
they felt to market and enlarge their firms’ practices.  Ultimately, Judge
Pauley’s opinion describes a “phalanx”43 of lawyers from top law firms
participating in the meetings of the Arbitration Coalition and the Consumer
Companies Class Action Working Group.  Judge Pauley’s opinion also
reveals that a few of those firms specifically benefitted from solicitations
for donations to support the production of amicus briefs in cases before the
United States Supreme Court and federal circuit courts.44  Among outside
counsel, Ballard Spahr attorney Alan Kaplinsky was particularly active in
helping to organize meetings, participating in them, writing amicus briefs,
and advising clients regarding the inclusion of class action-barring
41. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 434–35 (observing that seven Issuing Banks had adopted class
action-barring arbitration clauses by 2009 and that 13 of the 20 largest Issuing Banks have
adopted such clauses) (citing to ARBITRATION STUDY, infra note 147, at 21). The Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no violation of the Sherman Act, but newspaper
reports suggest that the clearly erroneous standard of review was significant:
“If you had just read the facts in Judge Pauley’s opinion you would have expected it to
come out the other way,” said Judge Jacobs, who heard the appeal alongside Circuit
Judges Pierre N. Leval and Lynch. Judge Lynch also said he would have “expected it to
come out the other way.”
Pete Brush, 2nd Circ. Questions Tossing of AmEx, Citi Consumer Suits, LAW 360 (Nov. 10, 2015,
6:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/725546/2nd-circ-questions-tossing-of-amex-citi-con-
sumer-suits.
42. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 430 (observing that in 1999, the Issuing Banks’ collective
market share was 82.91% “as measured by transaction volume and 79.82% as measured by out-
standing balances. . . . By 2005, this percentage had risen to 86.53% measured by transaction
volume and 87.64% measured by outstanding balances. . .”).
43. Id. at 428.
44. See also David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empiri-
cal Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015) (reviewing data that indicates that
certain firms or lawyers also have become extreme repeat players in representing defendant corpo-
rations in consumer arbitration).
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mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses.45  In-house counsel
also were involved in all of the events described in Judge Pauley’s opinion.
Probably the person most active and most particularly focused on the use of
arbitration to avoid class actions was Duncan MacDonald, a former Citi
general counsel who was hired by First USA after it became an early
adopter of a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause.46  Importantly, only
in-house counsel were involved in some of the teleconferences and the
meetings of the In-House Counsel Working Group.
As this essay will describe infra, a few of the lawyers involved in these
events focused on the need to develop arbitration clauses and practices that
were demonstrably fair to consumers—or that at least would avoid being
judged as heavy-handed or unfair.47  But the lawyers who were the most
vocal and insistent proponents of arbitration were more likely to highlight
the dangers presented by class actions and, especially, by plaintiffs’ class
action lawyers.
Some representatives of national dispute resolution organizations,
meanwhile, appear to have played supporting roles.  They attended early
meetings and even served as amici in some key cases before the Supreme
Court.  But Judge Pauley’s opinion focuses most on the marketing efforts
and “cross-fertilization” function of these representatives as they partici-
pated in sidebar teleconferences or email exchanges to encourage the ex-
panded adoption of class action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses by updating credit card issuers about other issuers’ internal discus-
sions and experience with such clauses.
With this overview, this essay now will turn to a more detailed, year-
by-year chronology of the events that led to the spread of class action-bar-
ring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the general purpose credit
card market.  For the most part, the chronology is based on the events de-
scribed in Judge Pauley’s opinion.  However, because of the timing of at-
tempts to reform Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
initiatives undertaken (or attempted) by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA) and the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolu-
tion, the chronology also references these events.
45. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 416–18, 420–26. 428–30.
46. Id. at 416–18, 420–25, 429.
47. Id. at 431 (describing efforts to develop best practices, Discover’s adoption of an opt-out
provision, but also noting: “This Court credits Plaintiffs’ compelling evidence that Discover’s opt-
out option—utilized by less than 0.1% of cardholders—did not meaningfully counteract any loss
in consumer choice.”).
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B. Chronology of Events Leading to the Spread of Class Action-Barring
Mandatory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses in the General
Purpose Credit Card Market
1. 1996–1997
Perhaps any description of the events that led to the adoption of class
action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses should begin with
the very first attempts to undo Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which provides for class actions.  But the chronology in this essay will
begin with revisions to Rule 23 that were proposed just prior to the series of
events included in Judge Pauley’s opinion.48
In April 1996, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recommended
proposed revisions to Rule 23.49  The revisions would have permitted certi-
fication of classes specifically for settlement and would have created both
opt-in and hybrid classes.50  For the purposes of this essay, it is most signif-
icant that the Advisory Committee proposed to add a few factors to deter-
mine whether the questions of law and fact common to class members
predominated over individual questions and whether a class action repre-
sented a superior method for fair and efficient adjudication.51  These factors
would be particularly relevant to proposed classes composed of members
who had only small individual claims—e.g., consumers.  In particular, pro-
posed Rule 23(b)(3)(A) would have required courts to consider “the practi-
cal ability of individual class members to pursue their claims without class
certification,”52 while proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(B) would have required con-
48. Professor Michael Green has similarly noted a temporal relationship between the 1991
amendment of Title VII to permit jury trials and employers’ adoption of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in their contracts with employees. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth
of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Employment Discrimination
Claims, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 399, 454–59 (2000); Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and
Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate, 8 NEV. L. J. 59–60, 74, n.78 (2007).
49. The Advisory Committee continuously studies the rules and recommends changes to the
Judicial Conference of the United States through a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See Committee Membership Selection, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.us-
courts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection (last visited
Oct. 30, 2016).  The Standing Committee approved these proposed revisions for publication and
public comment. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appel-
late, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523 (West Group 1996).
50. Thomas E. Willging and Emery G. Lee III explain that the proposal before the Commit-
tee at this time:
. . .would have retained the (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) classes and added subsections that
would have expanded certification options to include settlement classes (including
“claims that could not be litigated on a class basis”), opt-in classes (using “permissive
joinder” as the rubric), and hybrid classes that would join claims for injunctive relief
with claims for individual damages under opt-in, opt-out, or settlement class
certification.
Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification and Class Settlement: Findings from
Federal Question Cases, 2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 332 (2011).
51. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
52. Proposed Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559.
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sideration of  “class members’ interests in maintaining or defending sepa-
rate actions.”53  Proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F) would have provided for
consideration of  “whether the probable relief to individual class members
justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation.”54
The Committee’s meeting minutes and proposed Advisory Committee
Notes describe the concerns that led to these proposals.  Those concerns
remain strikingly familiar today.  On one hand, some members of the Com-
mittee expressed the conviction that class actions primarily serve the finan-
cial interests of plaintiffs’ class action lawyers and not the interests of
individual class members.55  On the other hand, other Committee members
expressed the equally-strong conviction that class actions represent the only
viable means for those with small claims to achieve individual relief and
systemic change.56
The Federal Judicial Center conducted research at the request of the
Committee, and the research showed that the small claims involved in class
actions were, indeed, quite small and thus very unlikely to be individually
litigated.  The research also showed that on a percentage basis, the fees of
plaintiffs’ class action lawyers were not unreasonable.57  The resulting pro-
posed subparagraph A was meant to require courts to consider individual
class members’ realistic ability to pursue their claims individually.58  Its
language likely would have permitted courts to find that some plaintiffs—
53. Id. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action,
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 34–37 n.133 (2000) (also remarking
on these proposals).
54. 167 F.R.D. 523, 559. Interestingly, broader language was proposed for subparagraph F in
1995: “(F) whether the public interest in—and the private benefits of—the probable relief to
individual class members justify the burdens of the litigation.” See THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL.,
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 107 (Federal Judicial Center 1996).
55. See 167 F.R.D. 523, at 540.  For more recent commentary regarding such concerns, see,
David Segal, A Little Walmart Gift Card for You, a Big Payout for Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31
2006, at 3 (describing a class action settlement in which class members received gift cards from
Walmart that “sounded as though the lawyers for Walmart and those for the plaintiffs had devised
a settlement that would pump up fees for the latter while limiting outlays from the former”).
56. See 167 F.R.D. 523, at 540, 542, 546. See also Gilles, supra note 6.
57. See 167 F.R.D. 523, at 561; Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 90. In the conclusion, the
co-authors wrote:
Based on anecdotal evidence, we expected to find a high level of abuse in the form of
attorney’s fees that were disproportionate to the class recoveries. Instead we found that
attorney’s fees were generally in the traditional range of approximately one-third of the
total settlement. While attorneys clearly derived substantial benefits from settlements,
the recoveries to the class in most cases were not trivial in comparison to the fees. But,
recoveries by individual class members were in amounts that could not be expected to
support individual actions. This finding confirms that many cases satisfy an underlying
purpose of Rule 23, which is to provide a mechanism for the collective litigation of
relatively small claims that would not otherwise support cost-effective litigation. Our
findings, however, do not address the monetary value or sufficiency of plaintiffs’ recov-
eries in relation to any monetary losses they may have incurred.
Id.
58. See 167 F.R.D. 523, at 537, 561–62.
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e.g., those involved in mass tort claims, with very significant individual
injuries—might be able to pursue their claims individually.  Meanwhile,
proposed subparagraph F likely would have permitted the denial of class
certification for purposes of settlement if a court found that the real benefi-
ciaries of a class settlement were the plaintiffs’ class action lawyers—e.g.,
settlements in which class members receive coupons while their lawyers
receive cash.59  In other words, when class action settlements appeared to
benefit the defendants and lawyers more than members of the class, courts
could reasonably conclude that the probable relief to individual class mem-
bers would not justify the costs and burdens of class litigation.60
Importantly, the Advisory Committee recognized that “there may be
indirect benefits to the public at large in deterring wrongdoing, and in some
cases it may be desirable to force disgorgement of wrongful profits without
regard to individual benefits.”61  This recognition of class actions’ potential
deterrent value, however, was not reflected in any of the new factors pro-
posed for inclusion in Rule 23.
The American Bar Association (ABA) noticed this exclusion.  In Feb-
ruary of 1997, the ABA’s policy-making body, the House of Delegates,
weighed in on the proposed amendments, voting to support many of them—
including the “proposed revisions to 23(b)(3)(A) and (B) that would focus
on the size of the individual claims in determining their viability without
certification and the individual interest of class members in maintaining
separate actions.”  However, the House of Delegates  “oppose[d] the pro-
posed revision to Rule 23(b)(3)(F), which would provide for a balancing of
probable relief to individual class members with the costs and burdens asso-
ciated with class litigation unless the Rule would further provide for the
consideration of the deterrent effect of accumulating small recoveries.”62
In the spring of 1997, while the debate over the proposed amendments
to Rule 23 continued, the venerable and non-profit American Arbitration
Association (AAA) undertook its own initiative.  This dispute resolution
organization convened a “National Consumer Disputes Advisory Commit-
tee.”63  The Advisory Committee’s membership included individuals drawn
from the AAA, corporate general counsel, universities’ general counsel, as
59. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, § 1712, 119 Stat. 4, 6 (2005)
(providing that in such cases, lawyers are paid based on the number of people who actually re-
deem their coupons and not upon the number of people eligible to receive such coupons).
60. See 167 F.R.D. 523, at 540.
61. Id. See also Myriam E. Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Liti-
gants from the Civil Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1537–38 (2016) (arguing that “low-income
groups are more likely to experience violations of statutory rights that give rise to class-wide and
collective legal claims” and therefore “of vastly greater consequence for this population is the
deterrent effect of class actions upon future wrongdoers.”).
62. See Select ABA Resolutions on Class Actions, 1997 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. TORT AND INS.
PRAC. SEC. REP. 116 (emphasis added).
63. See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N 1, 4 (Apr. 17, 1998), https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014.
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well as representatives from government-subsidized home loan agencies,
state and federal regulatory agencies, and consumer organizations.64  The
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee began meeting.
A few months later, in October 1997, the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules chose to abandon the particular proposed revisions to Rule
23(b)(3) discussed here in favor of permitting further experimentation.65
Therefore, at the end of the public comment period, these particular revi-
sions were not forwarded to the Supreme Court.66
2. 1998
Soon thereafter, in early 1998, arbitration clauses began to appear.
Credit card issuer First USA adopted a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clause for its contracts with consumers.  For purposes of this essay, it is
important to note that First USA was the first credit card issuer to do so.
First USA also retained Duncan MacDonald, Citi’s former general counsel
and an outspoken opponent of class actions, as a consultant on arbitration
issues and assigned him particular responsibility for developing a forum to
talk about arbitration issues.67  According to Judge Pauley’s opinion in
Ross, MacDonald was a constant presence and voice in the events that
followed.
In April 1998, the AAA’s National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee (which had begun meeting in 1997) produced A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes to guide the
use of ADR processes to resolve consumer disputes.68  The Protocol’s
Statement of Principles asserted parties’ entitlement to a “fundamentally-
fair ADR process” with the Principles serving as “embodiments of funda-
mental fairness.”69  The Protocol provided, among other things, for: inde-
pendent and impartial neutrals and administration; consumers’ continued
access to small claims court; reasonable costs for consumers (including
64. Id. at 32–33 (listing the signatories to the Due Process Protocol).
65. See id. at n.7; Willging & Lee, supra note 50, at 332.
66. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1753.1 (3d ed. 2009).
67. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 416.
68. See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at
1–3. See also AM. BAR ASS’N, ADDRESSING DISPUTES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 36, n.50 (2002); Judith Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, The Private in Courts, and the Erasure of
Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2852–53 (2015) (observing that the AAA’s decisions to produce the
protocol “imposing fee schedules with caps, to create ethical standards, and to revise its rules and
fee schedules” represented “matters of ‘internal policy’” while other self-regulatory initiatives—
like the adoption of ethical principles, the commitment to diversity, and information disclosure
and dissemination also represent “choices” that are not universally followed by ADR providers;
also reporting that many social media arbitration clauses do not meet the “‘due process fairness
tests’” of the AAA).
69. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at 1, 9.
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consideration of their ability to pay); arbitrator-supervised exchange of in-
formation; consumers’ access to all remedies available in courts of law and
equity; and consumers’ access (upon request) to written explanations of ar-
bitral awards.70  The Protocol also strongly encouraged the use of media-
tion.71  It did not address class action waivers.  (The AAA currently
conditions its provision of service upon compliance with the Protocol72 and
has been removed from some consumer agreements due to businesses’ un-
willingness to abide by the principles contained in the Protocol.)73
Other credit card issuers also began to consider including mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  In November 1998, American Express’
lawyers successfully “pitched” the inclusion of an arbitration clause to top
executives.  They urged that the inclusion of arbitration was an “easy call”
and would “lower[ ] litigation costs in the short term and [avoid] very ex-
pensive class action suits in the medium to longer term.”74
In the same month, Citi began considering the inclusion of an arbitra-
tion provision and contacted Ballard Spahr lawyer Alan Kaplinsky.  Kaplin-
70. Id. at 1–3.
71. Id. at 2.  The complete list of principles contained in the Protocol are:
1. Fundamentally-fair process
2. Access to information regarding ADR program
3. Independent and impartial neutral; independent administration
4. Quality and competence of neutrals
5. Small claims
6. Reasonable cost
7. Reasonably convenient location
8. Reasonable time limits
9. Right to representation
10. Mediation
11. Agreements to arbitrate
12. Arbitration hearings
13. Access to information
14. Arbitral remedies
15. Arbitration awards
Id. at 1–3.  The Protocol does not address class action waivers.
72. See THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH ET AL., NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON CONSUMER AND EM-
PLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CONSUMER ARBITRATION ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY REPORT 48
(2012) (“Importantly, AAA reviews arbitration clauses for their compliance with the Due Process
Protocol. When AAA has found deviation from the Protocol, it has rejected cases or has required
the company to agree to correct deficiencies.”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz,
Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 44–45 (U. of Kan. Sch. Of Law, Working Paper No.
2011-4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1904545 (click on “Download This Paper”) (reporting the re-
sults of first empirical study of the AAA’s enforcement of its Consumer Due Process Protocol and
finding that the AAA’s review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance appears to be effec-
tive at identifying and responding to those clauses with protocol violations); Horton & Chan-
drasekher, supra note 44, at 91 (observing that the “prophylactic steps” resulting from the AAA’s
adoption and enforcement of its Consumer Due Process Protocols may make the AAA “more
amenable to consumer plaintiffs than other venues”).
73. See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 63, at
11.
74. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 415.
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sky was a “thought leader”75 according to Judge Pauley, and along with
MacDonald, he would be a key player in many of the events to follow.
Many describe him as the architect of mandatory pre-dispute consumer ar-
bitration clauses, as well as class action waivers in such clauses.76  Ulti-
mately, Kaplinsky assisted American Express, Capital One, Citi, and
Discover with their arbitration clauses.
3. 1999
In April 1999, one of Kaplinsky’s clients, American Express, joined
First USA in including a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause in its
credit card contracts.  But American Express added a new wrinkle.  Its arbi-
tration clause also required consumers’ waiver of their right to pursue class
actions.77
Also in 1999, a group of lawyers, corporate representatives, and others
met to explore arbitration.  According to Judge Pauley’s opinion, this meet-
ing originated with a conversation between Timothy Heine, Managing
Counsel in American Express’ General Counsel’s Office, and two
WilmerHale partners, Chris Lipsett and Ron Greene.  Ultimately, the meet-
ing was held at WilmerHale’s offices.  It was designed to market
WilmerHale’s capabilities and to demonstrate that the firm was “at the lead-
ing edge” on arbitration.  This was in response to pressure to enlarge the
firm’s practice.78  Meeting co-sponsors included American Express, Citi,
First USA, and Sears Roebuck & Co.79 There were no dispute resolution
organization representatives at this meeting.
After that first meeting, MacDonald, Heine, Lipsett, and Kaplinsky
worked together to create the “Arbitration Coalition,” a group that met an-
other 18 times.  The Arbitration Coalition held its first meeting in July
1999.  This inaugural session included in-house counsel, outside counsel,
representatives of credit card-issuing banks and companies selling con-
sumer goods and services, representatives of dispute resolution organiza-
tions (specifically, National Arbitration Forum (NAF) and JAMS), and even
a representative of a public relations firm.  According to Judge Pauley’s
75. Id. at 416.
76. See Alan S. Kaplinksy & Mark J. Levin, FTC Continues to Ban Mandatory Arbitration in
Magnuson-Moss Warrantly Claims, Ballard Spahr LLP (June 3, 2015), http://www.ballard
spahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2015-06-03-ftc-continues-to-ban-mandatory-arbitration-
in-magnuson-moss-warranty-claims.aspx.
77. Although Judge Pauley indicates that American Express was the first general purpose
credit card issuer to include a class action waiver, others have reported that Discover Platinum
actually was the first credit card issuer to do this. See Johanna Harrington, To Litigate or Arbi-
trate? No Matter—The Credit Card Industry is Deciding For You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 102
(2001). Certain academics spotted the clash between arbitration and class actions early on. See
Gilles, supra note 6, at 378; Sternlight, supra note 53, at n.5 (2000).
78. Ross, 35 F.Supp. 3d at 415.
79. Id.
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opinion, Kaplinsky warned the attendees of the plaintiffs’ bar’s “take no
prisoners” assault and the need to be equally well-networked in order to
prevail.80  Meanwhile, the meeting’s agenda included “working together to
turn the tide” with subheadings that included “sharing best practices” and
“drafting fair, enforceable arbitration provisions.”81
There were two more meetings of the Arbitration Coalition in 1999.
The participants shared thoughts, materials, legal briefs, arbitration clauses,
change-in-term notices, talking points, and answers to frequently asked
questions.  They also heard warnings regarding rogue or unsophisticated
players whose attempts to be heavy-handed or unfair had the potential to
cause consumer arbitration to be viewed in an unfavorable light.82  Accord-
ing to Judge Pauley, there were also expressions of concern about the satel-
lite litigation that arbitration had already spawned and a description of NAF
as a “creditor’s tool.”83  The participants also discussed the need to estab-
lish a secure site for their communications, the value of developing a white
paper, and potential funding of amicus briefs for submission by trade as-
sociations (and without any attribution to members of the Arbitration
Coalition).84
By this point, representatives of dispute resolution organizations were
no longer attending the meetings of the Arbitration Coalition.  Between the
group meetings, however, individual conversations continued between NAF
representatives and credit card issuers for updates regarding the experience
of the credit card issuers that had already implemented arbitration provi-
sions.85  In addition, Steve Daily,86 in-house counsel at Discover, circulated
draft fairness guidelines, noting that the banks wanted to be able to con-
vince customers that arbitration was being used in a fundamentally fair way
and not to deprive customers of any rights.87
Late in 1999, there were also solicitations for amicus briefs in an Elev-
enth Circuit case, Baron v. Best Buy,88 appealing a district court’s refusal to
compel arbitration based in part on its finding that NAF did not represent a
sufficiently “neutral, inexpensive and efficient forum” to determine the
80. Id. at 417.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 419
83. Id.
84. Ross, 35 F.Supp. 3d at 419.
85. Id. at 423 (Chase representative reporting that NAF representative told her that “First
USA, Discover, American Express, Sears, Household, GE Capital, and MBNA had implemented
arbitration provisions through change-in-terms notices sent to cardholders”).
86. Daily left Discover and as of 2014, had his own companies. See Steven C. Daily,
ZOOMINFO, http://www.zoominfo.com/p/Steven-Daily/-768700 (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
87. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 420. It is not clear from Judge Pauley’s opinion whether Dailey
was specifically referencing the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
88. Baron v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 625 (11th Cir. 2001).
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claims at issue.89  Ultimately, Ballard Spahr filed a brief on behalf of the
American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bank Association and the
American Financial Services Association.  WilmerHale, meanwhile, filed a
brief in the case on behalf of a dispute resolution organization, FedNet.90
As 1999 came to an end, MBNA—a major consumer credit card is-
suer—notified its customers that it had now adopted an arbitration clause
and class action waiver.
4. 2000
In 2000, the Arbitration Coalition’s members held another five meet-
ings. The lawyers and corporate representatives in attendance were asked to
bring copies of their arbitration agreements, and there was discussion of
arbitration litigation, regulatory developments, and a best practices proto-
col.  There was also frequent discussion of public relations and the need for
consumer education.
At the last meeting of the Arbitration Coalition in 2000, MacDonald
presented the idea of creating a class action roundtable.  He said that he
intended to use the Arbitration Coalition as a base “to help [the] industry
deal with the larger issue of the proliferation of class action lawsuits.”91  He
conceived the one-day roundtable as a “brainstorming session that will fo-
cus exclusively on the growing epidemic of class actions and new, out-of-
the-box ways that industry might adopt in responding to them.”92  He also
suggested bringing in additional parties—Big Auto, manufacturing, phar-
maceutical companies, brokerage houses, healthcare companies, retail
stores, etc.
Separately, MacDonald also solicited support for more amicus briefs,
this time for a petition for certiorari in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala-
bama v. Randolph,93 and with associations, not banks, serving as the signa-
89. See Baron v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (denying
motion to compel arbitration, based in part on finding that the defendants had not sufficiently
demonstrated that NAF was a “neutral, inexpensive and efficient forum” to determine the claims
at issue, NAF’s procedures were unclear “given the changing nature of the rules they adopt and
the almost total discretion of the director to issue or modify any award or rule” and enforcement of
the arbitration clause “would raise an impermissible barrier to the Plaintiff’s exercise of her statu-
tory rights”), rev’d, 260 F.3d 625 (11th Cir. 2001).
90. This organization consisted of former judges offering their services as arbitrators; it later
became associated with the National Arbitration Forum. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Juris-
diction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1035 n.420
(2000) (“One such organization is FedNet, created by former federal judges, including Thomas
Lambros, who retired after serving as Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. Some 30 former federal judges are affiliated, either as shareholders or as ADR
providers.”).
91. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 423.
92. Id.
93. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The AAA and NAF also
filed amicus briefs. The AAA pointed the court to its Consumer Due Process Protocol. NAF
specified that its brief was in support of neither party and urged the court to require exhaustion of
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tories.  The funds for these amicus briefs would go to WilmerHale and
Ballard Spahr, the same firms that had authored the briefs in Baron.
Though MacDonald acknowledged that the cost was significant, he de-
scribed Green Tree Financial as “important in the extreme” and asserted
that victory “could send many class action lawyers to where they belong—
to the employment lines.”94
Other “sidebar” conversations also continued.  A representative of
NAF talked with one of the credit card issuers about collections and recov-
ery issues, noting that First USA would share the information that it could.
The NAF representative also acknowledged that at a certain point, such
information would become proprietary and competitive.95
In 2000, Bank of America and Household were the next credit card
issuers to announce their adoption of class action-barring arbitration
clauses.  Citi also made the decision to include such clauses, while Ci-
tigroup indicated its plans to include an arbitration clause unless there were
strong countervailing considerations.96
In the same year, another dispute resolution organization—the ABA’s
Dispute Resolution Section—established a Task Force on Consumer Arbi-
tration, which began meeting.  Kaplinsky was one of the members of this
Task Force, representing the ABA’s Business Law Section.
5. 2001
The Arbitration Coalition held another five meetings in 2001.  At one
of these meetings, MacDonald urged the attendees to “help us keep the
defense going” and warned that “our adversaries are determined to bring
[the] industry to its knees” and “find weak links in our [d]efenses.”97
However, another group also arose in 2001—and it was much more
clearly focused on class actions.  Its name was the “Consumer Companies’
all available remedies before coming to the court with pre-arbitration challenges: “First, make
every reasonable effort to resolve the issue, without returning to the court; Second, exhaust the
remedies for the alleged defect available within the arbitration structure; and Third, accept the
offer of other parties to the contract to modify the contract or process to eliminate the alleged
flaw.”  Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
20, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235).
94. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 422. Plaintiffs’ class action lawyers were also described as “old
fashioned protection rackets,” “a form of ‘legalized extortion to pay ransom,’” and “‘barbarians’
seeking to undermine the card industry.” Brief for Appellant and Special App., supra note 13, at
20.
95. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 420.
96. A  Skadden associate working full-time at Citigroup’s General Counsel’s Office (pursu-
ant to a “secondment”) recommended this decision in a memo that was forwarded to other Citi
affiliates. Id. at 427.  Apparently, this associate was  embedded within the company.  Corpora-
tions have encouraged firms to place third-year or fourth-year associates with them.  The corpora-
tions will pay the costs for such associates, but not the profit margin. See David B. Wilkins, Team
of Rivals?  Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2067, 2092–93 (2010).
97. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 424–25.
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Class Action Working Group.”  The “organizing committee” for this group
was comprised of MacDonald and representatives of Capital One,
WilmerHale, Ballard Spahr (Kaplinsky again), and Pepper Hamilton.  This
group’s first meeting attracted a very large and impressive group, including
representatives of major law firms, credit card-issuing banks, and other
credit card-issuing consumer companies.  The announcement of the group’s
first meeting also included a manifesto that championed the fight against
abusive class actions and observed “it’s the plaintiffs’ lawyers versus the
companies.  Suing companies is their business.”98  MacDonald was at the
first meeting of this group, urging that “class actions have become a gaming
business and a shakedown racket” and warning that the “[t]rial bar [is] more
organized because as competitors we are conditioned to go it alone due to a
century plus of [the] Sherman Act.”99  MacDonald called for the develop-
ment of an “efficient action plan.”100  At the group’s second—and last—
meeting later in the year, a Yale law professor made a presentation regard-
ing class action abuse.
By May 2001, there was discussion of the need to organize yet an-
other, and smaller, group that was limited to in-house counsel.  In-house
counsel, especially those at financial services companies, had not found the
recently organized Consumer Companies’ Class Action Working Group to
be sufficiently relevant.  In particular, they did not value the discussion of
non-financial issues, and they perceived that outside counsel “d[id] not see
the same internal issues that in-house counsel face.”101  In addition, there
was fear that the larger group was too academic, too theoretical, and insuffi-
ciently practical.
Thus a new, more targeted group came into being—the “In-House
Counsel Working Group”—and it held its inaugural telephone conference
call in July 2001. Its goals were to create an informal “information please”
network and identify means to “protect employees from the plaintiffs’ net-
work.”102  Their password was “ARBITRATION”—although at the Ross
trial, witnesses denied that they ever discussed arbitration.103
The In-House Counsel Working Group met by teleconference another
three times during 2001.  Some of these calls began with an antitrust admo-
nition.  In his opinion, Judge Pauley expressed greatest concern about the
In-House Counsel Working Group, in part because there was little evidence
of the topics that were discussed.104  This degree of non-transparency repre-
sents just the sort of circumstance that could constitute a “plus factor” in
98. Id. at 424.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 426.
102. Id.
103. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 426.
104. Id.
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support of an inference of conspiracy or collusion.105  In addition, even
though Discover had been one of the credit card issuers that was quite ac-
tive in the early days of the Arbitration Coalition, Discover was never in-
vited to the In-House Counsel Working Group’s meetings.106  Recall that
Discover’s in-house counsel, Daily, had been most vocal in urging the
adoption of a “fundamentally fair” arbitration process.  Meanwhile, sidebar
conversations continued among the lawyers.  There was discussion, for ex-
ample, of potential opt-outs and penalties for such opt-outs.107
After Providian began considering the addition of an arbitration clause
to its contracts, MacDonald put Providian and NAF in contact with each
other as part of his desire “to help move things along.”108  Later that year,
Providian became the next credit card issuer to announce that it was imple-
menting class action-barring arbitration clauses.
During 2001, the ABA Dispute Resolution Section’s Task Force met
several times and produced ten drafts of a potential resolution and report for
the ABA House of Delegates.  The final draft required all consumer arbitra-
tion agreements to conform to minimum standards outlined in an attached
draft “ABA Due Process Protocol for the Arbitration of Consumer Dis-
putes.”109  This draft Protocol did not bar class action waivers, but it re-
quired “a clear explanation of the basic distinctions between arbitration and
court proceedings, including disclosure that with arbitration. . . the con-
sumer may be denied the opportunity to participate in class action proceed-
ings.”110  Ultimately however, the Task Force concluded that it could
produce neither a resolution and report nor a set of due process protocols.
Thus, this attempt by the ABA Dispute Resolution Section to lead, or at
least influence, the development of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbi-
tration came to an end.111
105. Id. at 438, 446–447.
106. Id. at 426.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 447.
109. See Revised Draft, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RECOMMENDATION (June 6, 2001) (on file with author).
110. Id.
111. See generally Letter from Thomas Susman, Dir., ABA Governmental Affairs Office, R.
Larson Frisby, Senior Legislative Counsel, ABA Governmental Affairs Office, to Lela P. Love,
Chair, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, Homer La Rue, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution (Oct. 13, 2008) (on file with author).  Interestingly, according to minutes from the last
meeting of the Task Force, Alan Kaplinsky reported that the Business Law Section’s Ad Hoc
Committee on Consumer Arbitration had concluded there was “no need to redo the work of the
AAA” and had agreed to urge the ABA House of Delegates to adopt a resolution supporting the
AAA Consumer Due Process Protocol “and/or other protocols.”  Conference Call with Consumer
Arbitration Due Process Protocol Task Force (Apr. 5, 2001) (minutes on file with author).  The
ABA House of Delegates has never adopted a resolution supporting the general consumer due
process protocols.
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6. 2002
The Arbitration Coalition held another two meetings in 2002, while the
In-House Counsel Working Group held its last conference call that year.  A
few of the credit card issuers exchanged emails regarding cardholders’ at-
tempts to amend their agreements unilaterally by inserting additional dis-
pute resolution forums.112  The credit card issuers also discussed
consumers’ infrequent use of the arbitration provisions.  Judge Pauley’s
opinion does not indicate that any of these communications involved repre-
sentatives of dispute resolution organizations.
Chase notified its customers that it was implementing a class action-
barring arbitration clause.
7. 2003
In 2003, members of the Arbitration Coalition traveled to Washington
D.C. to hear arguments before the Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial.
The group also held its last meeting and teleconference.113
Discover notified its cardholders that it was adopting a new opt out
provision that would allow consumers, for the first time, to reject the arbi-
tration clause.  If cardholders failed to provide notice of their rejection
within two months, however, the provision became final.114
By the end of 2003, class action-barring arbitration clauses had been
adopted by all of the defendant banks in Ross—which meant that approxi-
mately 87% of all general-purpose credit card transactions were then sub-
ject to both mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and a class action waiver.115
C. Coda—and Identifying the Dispute System Designers
There is no doubt that by 2003, the major credit card issuers in the
general-purpose credit card market had implemented a new system for
resolving the majority of disputes between the credit card issuers and con-
sumers.  This essay will soon return to the structural framework introduced
by Amsler, Martinez, and Smith to consider whether the creation of this
new system merits categorization as “DSD” and whether the “designers”
considered the issues and questions that are now recommended by DSD
experts.  The essay will then turn to the principles that Amsler, Martinez,
Smith, and others urge should guide DSD.
Before turning to these questions, however, this essay will consider
briefly whether there are any “dispute system designers” in the events de-
scribed supra.  Clearly, some individuals played leading roles.  In-house
112. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 429.  The additional forums referenced here likely were compet-
ing providers of dispute resolution or arbitration services.
113. Id. at 429–30.
114. Id. at 430.
115. Id. at 456.
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lawyers MacDonald (First USA) and Heine (American Express) were early
and strong advocates for a new dispute system.  Outside counsel Kaplinsky
(Ballard Spahr) and Lipsett (WilmerHale) also were leading advocates for
the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses and class action waiv-
ers.  To greater and lesser degrees, these four individuals were involved in:
organizing opportunities to educate credit card issuers regarding both arbi-
tration and class action waivers; encouraging them to adopt class action-
barring arbitration clauses; facilitating information exchanges regarding
such clauses; funding litigation to support judicial enforcement of such
clauses; and thinking “outside the box” to find means to undermine the
viability of class actions and the class action bar.
The representatives of some dispute resolution organizations, particu-
larly NAF, also played roles in the rise of class action-barring mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, but Judge Pauley’s opinion suggests that
they were more involved in cross-fertilization and the marketing of their
services than in designing a dispute system.116  Indeed, the only dispute
resolution organizations that appeared to step back and consider issues of
overall design were the AAA and the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution,
as they brought together representative groups of stakeholders.  Only the
AAA succeeded in developing something concrete—the Consumer Due
Process Protocol.117  Meanwhile, Judge Pauley never identifies the AAA as
a participant in or contributor to any of the meetings or communications
that led to all of the defendants’ adoption of class action-barring mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.118
It must be noted that the Consumer Due Process Protocol did not ad-
dress the issue of class action waiver, probably because the first adoption of
such a waiver occurred only after publication of the Protocol.  Long after
the series of events detailed supra, both the ABA Section of Dispute Reso-
lution and the AAA repeated their efforts to bring together stakeholders to
address both mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration and class action
waivers.  The precipitating event was a 2009 lawsuit brought by Minnesota
Attorney General Lori Swanson against NAF—then the largest provider of
116. Id. at 423 (describing conversation between Chase and NAF regarding how other credit
card-issuing banks were dealing with arbitration); Id. at 447 (describing MacDonald’s facilitation
of communication between NAF and Providian “to help move things along” and credit card-
issuing banks’ other contacts with NAF to try to learn about their competitors’ plans).
117. See Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design, supra note 16, at 239–43 (examining
how the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol attempts to minimize the unfairness that can
result from one party’s control over system design and concluding that “[w]hat is apparent is that
justice systems designed by one party will often look very different from those designed mutually
by the parties or those designed by third parties”).
118. It is interesting to note, however, that the CFPB has gathered substantial evidence that the
AAA now dominates this particular arbitration market.  Specifically, the CFPB reported that “the
AAA is specified as at least one potential choice of contractually-specified arbitration administra-
tors in 98.5% of the credit card market we studied.”  ARBITRATION STUDY, infra note 136, § 5-1,
at 4, n.5.
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consumer debt arbitration services in the U.S.—that alleged NAF’s viola-
tion of the state’s consumer protection statutes.  In response, NAF quickly
agreed to end its substantial consumer debt arbitration business.119  That
same year, the AAA convened a “National Task Force on the Arbitration of
Consumer Debt Collection Disputes.”120  Soon thereafter, in early 2010, the
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution convened a separate effort, the “Con-
sumer Arbitration Study Group.”121  The single meeting of the Section’s
Study Group included Alan Kaplinsky and several of the members of the
AAA’s National Task Force.122  The Section’s Study Group also recom-
mended a series of next steps, including the value of continuing such meet-
ings and discussions.123  But once again, it was the AAA that managed to
produce something concrete.  In October, 2010, the AAA’s National Task
Force released its Consumer Debt Collection Due Process Protocol and
Statement of Principles.  This protocol does not include a principle regard-
ing class action waivers, but it provides an extensive summary of the Task
Force members’ views on class actions.  The summary concludes:
In light of the strong but opposing views by various mem-
bers of the Task Force on the subject of class actions, the Task
Force was unable to come to a consensus on the issue except to
“agree to disagree.” Therefore, these Principles take no position
on the issue of class actions, either within the context of debt
collection arbitration, litigation or otherwise.124
119. The lawsuit, its allegations and NAF’s response are described in detail in Nancy A.
Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395,
427–31 (2010).
120. Am. Arbitration Ass’n., Consumer Debt Collection Due Process Protocol, Statement of
Principles of the National Task Force on the Arbitration of Consumer Debt Collection Disputes 1
(October, 2010), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer?_afrLoop=8834822784271&_
afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D
8834822784271%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D13xbmc9pi2_4.
121. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, REPORT OF THE
DISCUSSION OF THE CONSUMER ARBITRATION STUDY GROUP (JANUARY 15–16, 2010), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/dispute_resolution/consumerarbitrationre-
port.authcheckdam.pdf.
122. The author was one of the organizers of the Section’s Study Group, but was entirely
unaware at the time of the other initiatives described in this essay.
123. See, e.g., the following:
• Consumer, business, government and other stakeholders should meet [to] try and agree on
basic contract provisions on certain terms.
• Consumers need a place to resolve disputes; the Section and other entities should work to
improve the handling of consumer disputes in court and related access to justice issues,
including funding of courts, legal services, and dispute resolution services.
• Thanks to its broad base of support and credibility the ABA is in a unique position to
assist in developing and disseminating information and educating stakeholders.
° The ABA may study the operation of different choices.
° The ABA can be an education resource and source of information.
Id. at 18.
124. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, supra note 120, at 13.
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Many of the stakeholders who were involved in these 2009–2010 ef-
forts by the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and the AAA gathered
again a few years later, for a National Roundtable on Consumer Arbitration,
in 2012.  They were joined by representatives of the then-newly-created
CFPB.  The organizers of this event ultimately produced a summary report
that included a variety of useful resources for those interested in empirical
research and policy-making in this area.125  The report also summarized the
participants’ discussions, including their general agreement that it would be
worthwhile to identify “difficult” consumer-initiated claims that could be
converted into “easy” consumer-initiated claims, that it might be possible to
aggregate individual consumers’ online claims and identify appropriate trig-
gers for regulatory action, and that there was interest in “find[ing] reasona-
ble ways to assure that class actions are used only when necessary, [that]
companies provide consumers with real redress, and [that] consumers with
valid claims get access to legal representation.”126
Returning to the question of whether any individuals or organizations
served as “dispute system designers” during the period from 1997 to 2003,
it is important to recall that the credit card issuers’ in-house counsel ulti-
mately broke away from everyone else to form their own exclusive and
more focused group. This group did not include any of the four individuals
identified supra as leading players, although it did include a lawyer from
American Express—Julia MacDermott, the group counsel who had joined
Heine in 1998 to “pitch” arbitration.
Ultimately, therefore, it is unclear that any individual, organization, or
group of individuals or organizations could be identified as particularly re-
sponsible for “designing” this dispute system. Should someone have taken
that responsibility?  The essay will return to that question after applying the
structural framework proposed by Amsler, Martinez, and Smith to the
events described in Judge Pauley’s opinion, followed by application of the
dispute system design principles that they and others advocate.
125. See THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, NANCY WELSH, LISA BINGHAM [now Amsler] & LARRY
MILLS, NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CON-
SUMER ARBITRATION ROUNDTABLE SUMMARY REPORT (2012); Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lip-
sky, “Moving the Ball Forward” in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can
Planning, Talking, Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish?, 19 DISP. RESOL. MAG.
14 (2013).
126. STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 125, at 26.
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IV. THE SPREAD OF CLASS ACTION-BARRING MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
CONSUMER ARBITRATION CLAUSES: AN EXAMPLE OF
DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN?
A. Considering the Amsler, Martinez and Smith Structural Framework
1. Goals (“What do the system’s decision-makers seek to
accomplish?”  “Which types of conflicts does the system
seek to address?”)
From 1997 to 2003, the banks and consumer companies that issued
credit cards had a few clear goals: reduce the expense of litigation gener-
ally; reduce the incidence of expensive class actions; and reduce plaintiffs’
lawyers’ ability to pursue class actions.  In pursuing these goals, the credit
card issuers focused on preventing the aggregation of small claims into
class actions.  It is also abundantly clear that they sought to avoid paying
plaintiffs’ class action lawyers’ fees.
It is less clear that the credit card issuers affirmatively sought to de-
prive deserving consumers of the right or ability to seek individual redress.
Early on, some of the participants in the events described supra specifically
referenced the need to be “fair” and provide a “fundamentally fair” pro-
cess.127  At the same time, it is difficult to avoid noticing that these calls for
fairness were relatively infrequent, and they tended to be paired with dis-
cussion of the importance of public relations.128  In addition, it appears that
by 2002, the credit card issuers were aware that consumers were making
little use of the arbitration provisions to seek individual redress.  There is no
indication that they were concerned about this development, or took respon-
sive action to reverse the trend and encourage consumers’ pursuit of indi-
vidual redress.129
127. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 417 (regarding “drafting fair, enforceable arbitration provi-
sions”). See also id. at 420 (regarding the circulation of draft fairness guidelines and the need to
demonstrate that arbitration was being used in a fundamentally fair way).
128. Id. at 417, 422.
129. Recently, David Horton and Andrea Cann Chandrasekher reported that during this period
other consumer companies took action to encourage consumers to bring concerns or complaints
directly to the companies’ attention. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 44 (discussing
dispute resolution clauses that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion). Horton and
Chandrasekher also reported that the American Bankers Association funded a study by Ernst &
Young that examined consumers’ arbitration filings with NAF between 2000 and 2004 against
financial services companies.  According to Horton and Chandrasekher:
E&Y noted that most plaintiffs sought relatively small amounts of damages: 73% asked
for less than $15,000, 20% demanded between $15,001 and $75,000, and 7% requested
$75,001 or more. E&Y determined that consumers “won”—defined as recovering $1 or
more—in fifty-three of the ninety-seven awards (55%). Accordingly, E&Y cited the fact
that “consumers are not losing a disproportionate number of cases” as proof that they
“are [not] harmed by the arbitration process.”
Id. at 80 (quoting ERNST & YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CON-
SUMER LENDING CASES, 2–10 (2005)).
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2. Stakeholders (“Who are the stakeholders?” “What is their
relative power?” “What are their interests and how are
their interests represented in the system?”)
The stakeholders in this context clearly included consumers, consumer
organizations, consumers’ lawyers (including class action lawyers), govern-
mental/regulatory entities, general purpose credit card issuers, lawyers rep-
resenting the credit card issuers, lawyers who wanted to represent the
issuers, and dispute resolution organizations and professionals.  Importantly
however, the only stakeholders included in the meetings and discussions
described supra were the credit card-issuing banks and consumer compa-
nies, the lawyers who represented them (or wanted to represent them) and,
to a lesser degree, dispute resolution organizations, and public relations
firms.  Individual consumers, consumer groups, consumers’ lawyers (in-
cluding class action lawyers), and governmental/regulatory entities were not
in attendance.
It can be difficult to assess relative power in any precise manner.  In
contests between individual consumers and credit-card issuing banks, how-
ever, the banks (or consumer companies) likely wielded more power than
the consumers.130  The banks and consumer companies also likely wielded
more power than outside counsel, the dispute resolution organizations, or
consumer organizations.  It is less clear that the credit card-issuing banks
and consumer companies had more power when compared with the plain-
tiffs’ class action bar or governmental/regulatory entities.
Hopefully, while the credit card-issuing banks and consumer compa-
nies (and their in-house counsel) had financial and business interests as de-
scribed supra, they also had interests in operating in a manner consistent
with federal and state statutes and regulations, retaining their customers,
and sustaining their own reputations as responsible and trustworthy corpo-
rate citizens.  Consumers and governmental/regulatory agencies would
share many of these interests, although their interests in consumer protec-
tion and the ability to access effective redress might receive more empha-
sis.131  But only the financial and business interests of the credit card-
issuing banks and consumer companies clearly are represented in the new
dispute system established between 1998 and 2003, at least as described in
Judge Pauley’s opinion.132  If the credit card issuers had emphasized the
need to specify the AAA as their provider of consumer arbitration—or if
they had required compliance with the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Pro-
130. This may be somewhat less true today if tech-savvy consumers access and contribute to
online reviews of all sorts of products and services.
131. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS
IN DEBT LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 41–43 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/doc
uments/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-staff-report-repairing-bro
ken-system-protecting/debtcollectionreport.pdf.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 6–15.
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tocol—their interests in consumer protection and access to effective redress
might be more apparent.
Turning to outside counsel, Judge Pauley’s opinion strongly suggests
that their primary interest was in business development.133  The firms most
involved in organizing the meetings described supra were responsible for
writing the amicus briefs that were part of satellite litigation.  Their involve-
ment in the development of the consumer arbitration system apparently ex-
panded their business and their reputations in this area.  The development of
the new dispute system also may have met the business development inter-
ests of law firms specializing in debt collection.134  It is unclear, however,
that any other law firms’ or outside counsel’s financial or business interests
were met by the new system of mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration.
One would hope that outside counsel’s interests also included provid-
ing consumers with access to effective redress and ensuring operations con-
sistent with relevant statutes and regulations—particularly if these lawyers
understood themselves to be serving as “civic professionals” as well as
agents of their clients.135 As mentioned supra, commitment to these inter-
ests is less apparent in the new system unless the credit card issuers’ con-
tracts specified use of the AAA or its Consumer Due Process Protocol.136
133. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 444.
134. See Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 429–30 (2010) (describing the Mann Bracken firm). See also Horton &
Chandrasekher, supra note 44, at 83–87 (reporting that companies in consumer arbitration tend to
be represented by lawyers who have become extreme repeat players, and extreme repeat players
are much more likely to win).
135. See Nancy A. Welsh, Looking Down the Road Less Traveled: Challenges to Persuading
the Legal Profession to Define Problems More Humanistically, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 56–57
(2008); Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Binding Arbitration Is
Unjust: Ethical Implications for Dispute System Design in the Time of Vanishing Trials, FORDHAM
L. REV. (forthcoming, 2017) (reporting empirical research showing that as members of the public
learn more about mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, the more they believe it to be unjust and
illegitimate and urging the adoption of a more inclusive, more virtuous ethical ideal for transac-
tional attorneys to encourage them to “craft and design adhesion contracts [that] balance both the
interests of their client with the needs and perspective of the public”).
136. It must be acknowledged that at this point, no rigorous empirical research has established
the effect of the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol.  Instead, we have fragments of informa-
tion.  Public Citizen reported in 2007, for example, that data available from California indicated
that NAF’s arbitrators found for credit card companies 94.7% of the time; thus, consumers won
5.3% of the time. See Public Citizen, How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers (Sept.
2007) (http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm? ID=7545). The Searle Justice Institute’s
Task Force on Consumer Arbitration, meanwhile, reported in 2009 that for consumer arbitrations
administered by the AAA (presumably pursuant to the Protocol), consumers fared somewhat bet-
ter.  As claimants, consumers won some relief 53.3% of the time; business claimants—likely not
limited to credit card companies—won some relief 83.6% of the time. See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE
INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT xiii (2009) (http://www.searlearbitration.org/p/full_report.pdf). See also Sarah Ru-
dolph Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Fall 2008, at 30, 31 (citing Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, Default Judgments
Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 DENV. U. L. REV. 357 (1990)) (observing that in
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Obviously, dispute resolution organizations would have interests in
business development. They would want to be named as the providers of
arbitration services in the credit card issuing banks’ agreements with their
customers.  The new dispute system responded primarily to the business
development interests of those dispute resolution organizations that were
included in the credit card issuers’ contracts.  Hopefully, dispute resolution
organizations also would have strong interests in providing consumers with
access to effective redress, ensuring operations consistent with relevant stat-
utes and regulations, and providing processes that were fair.  The AAA’s
commitment to the latter three interests is most apparent due to its develop-
ment of the Consumer Due Process Protocol—which, as discussed supra,
called for a fundamentally fair process, independent and impartial neutrals
and administration, consumers’ access to small claims court, reasonable
costs for consumers, arbitrator-supervised exchange of information, con-
sumers’ access to all remedies available in courts of law and equity, con-
sumers’ access to written explanations of arbitral awards, and access to the
consensual option of mediation.  Admittedly, the AAA’s commitment to the
interests of effective redress, lawful operations and fair procedures would
be even more apparent if the Protocol dealt directly with the issue of class
action waiver—but the first adoption of a class action waiver occurred ap-
proximately one year after the AAA produced the Protocol.  It is also sig-
nificant that the AAA chose to enforce the Protocol even when such action
collection cases, the consumer almost certainly owes the debt and that this explains credit-card
companies’ high win rates in both arbitrations and traditionally litigated cases).
There is much better evidence of the effect of due process protocols in the context of
mandatory pre-dispute employment arbitration. See Christoper R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analy-
sis of Private Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 105, 128 (2004) (citing Lisa B. Bingham
& Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for Media-
tion and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that
Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT
ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53D ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 303
(Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004) (noting that the Bingham and Sarraf study com-
pared outcomes before and after an Employment Due Process Protocol was implemented and
found that employers arbitrating based on personnel handbook violations were less successful
after the protocol was used than they were before the protocol); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRA-
TION AND THE CONSTITUTION 145–56, 163–68 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) (citing Margaret M.
Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 369 (2004);
Richard J. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocols at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues and
a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. DSIP. RESOL. 165 (2005); Elizabeth Hill, Due
Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003) (examining the history
and effectiveness of the employment due process protocols and urging that fair procedures can be
in employers’ interests because they promote employees’ use of the procedures, increase the like-
lihood of the enforcement of arbitration clauses and arbitral awards, and reduce the risk that
plaintiffs’ lawyers will be able to disrupt the stability of arbitration proceedings).
As Professor Margaret Harding has noted, effective protocols also require provisions “to
monitor individual firms’ compliance with the protocols and to sanction noncompliance when
discovered. Such monitoring and enforcement provisions are absent in each of the protocols.” See
Harding, supra note 136, at 372.
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sometimes led to the organization’s removal from contracts and loss of bus-
iness.  Importantly, the new dispute system described by Judge Pauley did
not require the use of either the AAA or its Protocol.
As noted supra, individual consumers, consumers’ lawyers (including
class action lawyers), governmental/regulatory entities, and consumer
groups were not in attendance and their interests tended not to be reflected
in the dispute system described in Judge Pauley’s opinion.  The exception,
of course, would be when credit card issuers used the AAA or its Due Pro-
cess Protocol which was the product of a different process that included
consumer representatives.
3. Context and Culture (“How does the context of the dispute
system affect its viability and success?” “What aspects of
culture (organizational, social, national, or other) affect the
workings of the system?” “What are the norms for
communication and conflict management?”)
In order to answer questions regarding the effects of this particular
context’s structure, culture, and norms, it is necessary to identify the con-
text within which mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration sits.  That is
not as easy as it seems because arbitration does not sit within a single con-
text.  As Professor Lisa Amsler has noted (and as Professor Elinor Ostrom
noted before her), contexts may be “nested,” one within another.137  Per-
haps the first context to consider then is the fractious political and economic
culture that characterizes the United States.  Recent empirical research indi-
cates that American consumers assume that their birthright includes access
to their nation’s courts to resolve disputes with businesses, regardless of
whether their agreements provide for arbitration.138  Nested within that con-
text, however, are others.  The arbitration system established by the credit
card issuers between 1997 and 2003 was entirely private, with contractu-
ally-determined arbitral rules and panels.  As such, the system also fits
within a commercial, market-based context.  American consumers could
choose whether or not to do business with the credit card issuers that re-
quired the use of arbitration and the waiver of class actions.  Credit card
issuers could differentiate themselves from their competitors, highlighting
137. See Lisa Blomgren Amsler, Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System Designs That
Use Arbitration: Transparency, the Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32, 33–34
(2014) (citing ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (Princeton University
Press 2005); Lisa Blomgren Bingham (now Amsler), Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and
Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 (2008).
138. See Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1,
41–47 (2015) (reporting results of empirical study, including finding that arbitration clauses and
class action bars are not among the more important terms to consumers and that “consumers failed
to understand that they had surrendered their right to sue in court by a margin of more than six to
one”).
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for consumers the mandatory or voluntary nature of their arbitration
clauses, their inclusion or exclusion of class action waivers, and the poten-
tial effect of such clauses and waivers on the risks undertaken by
consumers.139
Judge Pauley’s opinion reveals, however, that the credit card issuers
did not choose to distinguish themselves from each other in a competitive
marketplace.140  They instead chose to confer, observe, and follow each
other’s lead in adopting arbitration clauses and class action waivers.  Their
consequent failure to bring class action-barring arbitration clauses to con-
sumers’ attention—i.e., their failure to compete and thus make the clauses
“salient” to consumers—increased the viability and likely success of their
preferred dispute system.  The fact that class action-barring mandatory arbi-
tration clauses then became dominant in the general purpose credit card
market in the U.S. means that American consumers had substantially less
ability to choose not to do business with a particular credit card issuer—and
this further increased the viability and likely success of the dispute
system.141
The dispute system established by the credit card issuers also fit within
another context—our public justice system—since consumers might use ar-
bitration to assert public rights and businesses might use the courts to en-
force arbitration clauses and arbitral awards.  This involvement of public
law and reliance upon the public courts suggest that the viability and suc-
cess of the dispute system should also depend upon compliance with rele-
vant substantive and procedural law. Concerns regarding such compliance
likely motivated the AAA, at least in part, to convene its panel of stakehold-
ers to develop the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
However, in a string of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
proclaimed a federal policy of supporting the enforcement of arbitration
clauses and has refused to see any threat to substantive or procedural law
unless the opponents of arbitration clauses can point to concrete evidence
demonstrating that there has been or will be a failure to comply with such
law.142
139. See Welsh, I Could Have Been A Contender, supra note 6, at 1154–55 (describing dis-
pute resolution procedures as part of risk management).
140. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431–32.
141. I thank Timothy Hoy for reminding me that in contrast to the larger banks, credit unions
and small banks are much less likely to include these clauses.
142. This is described as the “effective vindication” doctrine. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).  In a
famous footnote in Mitsubishi, a case involving international commercial arbitration and applica-
tion of the New York Convention, the Supreme Court observed that if an arbitration agreement
makes it impossible for a party to pursue federal statutory remedies, either explicitly or through
the combination of clauses regarding choice of arbitral forum, choice of law and limitation upon
judicial review, an American court would “have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.  In a series of cases involving claims by
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Judge Pauley’s opinion also demonstrates how the participants in the
meetings of the Arbitration Coalition, the Consumer Companies Class Ac-
tion Working Group and the In-House Counsel Working Group worked to
change the context of our public justice system, in order to make it ever
more hospitable to mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration and class
action waivers.  These groups’ funding and filing of amicus briefs in Green
Tree Financial and other cases represent particularly striking—and success-
ful—examples of such efforts.  Ultimately and somewhat counter-intui-
tively, then, the context of our public justice system also played a powerful
role in helping to ensure the viability and success of the system established
by the credit card issuers.
4. Processes and Structure (“Which processes are used to prevent,
manage, and resolve disputes?” “If there is more than one
process, are they linked or integrated?” “What are the
incentives and disincentives for using the system?” “What is
the system’s interaction with the formal legal system?”)
The only processes that appear to have been discussed by the various
groups described in Judge Pauley’s opinion were binding arbitration and
class actions, both of which fit into the category of “imposed” dispute reso-
lution processes.  The goal of the class action waiver, of course, was to
remove the class action as an option—thus reducing, not expanding, the
number of available process options.
For those contracts that required use of the AAA or its Consumer Due
Process Protocol, small claims court represented an additional procedural
choice, but it was also just one more option in the “imposed” category.
And while the Consumer Due Process Protocol encouraged the use of medi-
ation, it does not appear that any of the meetings or conversations detailed
seamen against cruise and cargo shipping companies under the federal Seaman’s Wage Act and
Jones Act, lower courts have repeatedly cited to this footnote, observing more specifically that if
an arbitration agreement provides no opportunity for judicial review of an arbitral award and an
American court is persuaded that choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses will “‘operate[ ] in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,’” the court will
“‘have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.’” Thomas v. Carni-
val Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that because the arbitration
clause specified that the arbitrator had to apply Panamanian law, the clause effectively waived and
foreclosed on the plaintiff’s rights under the Seaman’s Wage Act); Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines,
Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Bulgakova v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-
20023, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39231,  at *8 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010).  All of these cases
involved challenges to judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements, rather than arbitral awards.
In Italian Colors, the Supreme Court held that a class action waiver in an arbitration clause did not
violate the effective vindication doctrine, observing first that “the fact that it is not worth the
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to
pursue that remedy” and later: “The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two con-
tracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy than did
federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938.”  133 S. Ct. 2304, at
2311.
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in Judge Pauley’s opinion included the discussion of processes that could
prevent, manage, or resolve disputes through facilitated means.
Avoidance of the expenses associated with class actions represented
the incentive for credit card issuers to insert arbitration clauses in their con-
tracts.  Judge Pauley’s opinion does not reveal the development of any par-
ticular incentives to encourage consumers to use the dispute system.
Instead, for them, the use of arbitration was a non-discretionary part of their
decision to enter into a credit card agreement that would allow them to
purchase consumer goods or services.  Later, as detailed in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion,143 a consumer company introduced a tiered dispute res-
olution clause that provided opportunities to engage in negotiated processes
(implemented through customer relations) before moving to binding arbitra-
tion.  The clause at issue in Concepcion also included financial incentives
(inserted only after the class action had been commenced) to encourage
consumers to provide AT&T with online notice of their complaints and
pursue redress.144  The system’s interaction with the formal legal system,
however, continued to be limited to actions to enforce the arbitration clause
and class action waiver or, after the arbitration, petitions to enforce arbitral
awards.145
5. Resources (“What financial resources support the system?”
“What human resources support the system?”)
Judge Pauley’s opinion does not reveal discussion of the financial or
human resources required to support the arbitration clauses’ operation.  It
would be natural to assume that the credit card issuers imposing arbitration
and barring class actions paid for the arbitration process.  It would also be
natural to assume that the dispute resolution organizations preferred receiv-
ing payment from the credit card issuers rather than individual consumers.
Today, meanwhile, some arbitration clauses provide for the shifting of at-
torney’s fees.146  Pursuant to these provisions, a consumer who loses her
143. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitra-
tion, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 201–05
(2012) (examining the clause at issue).
144. See id.; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing
that the Concepcions commenced their class action in March 2006 while AT&T revised its arbi-
tration agreement to add a new premium payment clause in December 2006).
145. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012); Welsh, supra note 143, at 205–09
(describing and critiquing the grounds and level of judicial review currently available).
146. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 288 (2015);
see also Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1939, 1958 (2014) (observing that “Concepcion and cases like it from the lower courts have
emboldened drafters of adhesion contracts to embellish arbitration clauses with increasingly so-
phisticated procedural bells and whistles” and specifically identifying provisions that “restrict the
availability of interim and final remedies, limit discovery, shorten statutes of limitations, select
distant venues, and alter statutory fee shifting rules.”).  In its August 22, 2016 submission to the
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arbitration may be made responsible for the attorney’s fees incurred by the
winning corporation.
In terms of human resources, a consumer seeking individual redress
may be required to pursue arbitration alone, without a lawyer.  Research
indicates that as few as 14% of consumers in some contexts and as many as
60% of consumers in other contexts are represented by lawyers in arbitra-
tion.147  Meanwhile, research also indicates that the corporations involved
in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration tend to be represented, and their law-
yers are likely to be repeat players in consumer arbitration.148
6. Success, Accountability, and Learning (“How transparent is the
system?” “Does the system include monitoring, learning, and
evaluation components?” “Is the system successful?”)
As revealed by Judge Pauley’s opinion, from 1997 to 2003, in-house
counsel and representatives of dispute resolution organizations met and en-
gaged in sidebar conversations in order to provide each other with informa-
tion about their experience in adopting and implementing class action
barring arbitration clauses.149  In a sense then, there was transparency—but
only among the credit card issuers and some dispute resolution organiza-
tions.  There also may have been some monitoring, learning, and evaluation
CFPB, the National Consumer Law Center identified the following as “especially unfair practices
in individual arbitrations” that required CFPB regulatory action:
• Loser pays” provisions;
• Cost-splitting provisions or other provisions that require the consumer to bear exces-
sive costs (including lack of in forma pauperis fee waivers);
• “Inconvenient venue” provisions;
• Limitations on substantive rights including shorter statutes of limitations and caps on
damages;
• Inherently biased or unavailable arbitrators;
• Procedural hurdles;
• Secrecy provisions;
• Discovery limitations;
• Initiating collection actions in arbitration;
• Delay in paying arbitration fees, affecting commencement of arbitration proceedings;
and
• Severance, savings, and delegation clauses.
Lauren Saunders et al., Comment to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Regarding 12
CFR Part 1040, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 4 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
arbitration/comments-arbitration-agreements-2016.pdf.
147. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT SEC.
1028(A) § 1.4.3 (March 2015) [hereinafter ARBITRATION STUDY]  (reporting that “[o]verall, con-
sumers were represented by counsel in roughly 60% of the cases, though there were some varia-
tions by product” and that “[c]ompanies almost always had counsel.”); Horton & Chandrasekher,
supra note 44, at 82 (referencing Ernst & Young and Searle reports that indicated that 86% and
43% of consumer-plaintiffs, respectively, were not represented by lawyers in arbitration).
148. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 147, at § 1.4.3; Horton & Chandrasekher, supra
note 44, at 83–87 (reporting that companies in consumer arbitration tend to be represented by
lawyers who have become extreme repeat players, and extreme repeat players are much more
likely to win).
149. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 414–32.
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built into some dispute resolution organizations’ arbitration programs.  For
example, there is some indication that NAF disclosed information about its
arbitrators’ credentials and judgment trends to Agora, a company associated
with the debt collection industry (by way of its relationship with the private
equity firm Accretive LLC).150  In 2005, meanwhile, the American Bankers
Association funded a study by Ernst and Young of consumers’ arbitration
filings with NAF against financial services companies between 2000 and
2004.151  Presumably, this was to evaluate use of arbitration in this context.
But there was no transparency, monitoring, learning, or evaluation
built into the system of class action-barring arbitration clauses for consum-
ers, consumer protection organizations, or the federal and state agencies
responsible for consumer protection and regulation.
Regarding “success,” it is important to recognize that there is no single
definition of the term.  Rather, assessing “success” requires recalling the
context into which this dispute system fits and the goals of the decision-
makers, as described supra.  The credit card issuers sought, more than any-
thing else, to reduce their litigation expenses, especially the expenses asso-
ciated with class actions.  It is not entirely clear that they achieved this goal.
Some of the most significant expenses simply moved to another battlefield
as mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration clauses and class action
waivers became very frequent subjects of litigation, with some cases going
all the way to the Supreme Court.152  The parties and those interested in
encouraging amicus briefs continued to bear the expense of paying defense
lawyers.  As Judge Pauley observed, these were very good and very expen-
sive lawyers.153  Meanwhile, there were costs associated with arbitration.
150. See Complaint at 18–19, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. July 14, 2009) (alleging that Agora personnel had access to such highly confidential informa-
tion).  The complex (and apparently profitable) relationships among NAF, Accretive, Agora and
Forthright are described in more detail in Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough,” supra note 119,
at 427–30, 433–35.  For purposes of considering whether any monitoring, evaluation, or learning
was built into NAF’s program and shared with “repeat players,” it is enough to note that: 1)
Accretive was a private equity firm that was the sole owner of Agora; 2) Accretive and NAF
jointly owned another company, Forthright, which was responsible for most of the tasks involved
in administering arbitrations and mediations; 3) NAF was responsible for retaining the neutrals but
it is unclear whether NAF or Forthright was responsible for selecting neutrals for cases and paying
them; 4) Accretive and a large debt-collection firm, Mann Bracken, jointly owned another com-
pany, Axiant LLC; and 5) Axiant was responsible for collecting on court judgments enforcing
awards issued by NAF’s arbitrators.
151. See David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 Geo. L. J. 57, 80, n.142 (2015) (citing and describing ERNST
& YOUNG, OUTCOMES OF ARBITRATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONSUMER LENDING CASES
(2005)).
152. See, e.g., DIRECTTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665
(2012); Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 559 U.S.
662 (2010); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
153. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 452.
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The filing fees charged by arbitration providers, for example, often were
much higher than those charged by courts.  If credit card issuers used arbi-
tration to pursue debt collections, they had to pay these higher filing fees as
well as their lawyers.  If the credit card issuers then were required to go to
court to enforce arbitral awards, they would face more filing fees and litiga-
tion-related expenses.
It is important to note, however, that one particular expense was re-
duced.  The campaign to win judicial enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses and class action waivers was generally successful in re-
ducing the likelihood that credit card issuers would be required to pay dam-
ages to members of a class or pay the fees of their lawyers.
Based on information gathered by the CFPB, it also appears that the
campaign was successful in reducing the likelihood that credit card issuers
would be required to compensate consumers.  This is because very few con-
sumers take advantage of arbitration clauses to initiate individual claims
against companies.154
7. Interim Conclusion Based on the Amsler, Martinez and Smith
Structural Framework
There is not a perfect fit between the issues and questions that should
have been addressed in the course of designing a new system for the resolu-
tion of disputes and the events and decisions described in Judge Pauley’s
opinion.  The most important deficits are these: (1) the credit card issuers’
failure to include consumers, representatives of consumer organizations,
and representatives of governmental/regulatory agencies as essential stake-
holders with legitimate interests that required recognition in the develop-
ment of the system and (2) courts’ failure (and particularly the failure of the
Supreme Court) to require this new dispute system to demonstrate its adher-
ence to substantive and procedural safeguards sufficient to protect consum-
ers’ and the general public’s interests in reasonable adherence to the rule of
law and a trustworthy justice system.155
154. See ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 147, at § 1.4.3 (reporting that “[f]rom 2010 through
2012, an average of 616 individual AAA cases were filed per year for six product markets com-
bined: credit card; checking account/debit cards; payday loans; prepaid cards; private student
loans; and auto loans” and that “[o]f the 1,847 disputes filed between 2010 and 2012 concerning
the six product markets, the standard AAA ‘claim forms’ identify consumers alone as filing an
average of 411 cases each year” with “[t]he remaining filings. . . recorded as made by companies
or as mutually submitted by both the consumer and the company”). See also Judith Resnik, Dif-
fusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, The Private in Courts, and the Erasure
of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812–13 (2015) (reporting that AT&T wireless customers filed a
total of 134 arbitration claims with the AAA between 2009 and 2014 while AT&T’s wireless
customers increased from 85 million to 120 million during the same time period); Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally
Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 98–100 (2012).
155. See Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, supra note 143, at 216–28.
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As I have explained elsewhere,156 these deficits matter particularly in
the context of arbitration because arbitral awards have no coercive power
without the guarantee of enforcement provided by our public courts.  Mean-
while, the FAA provides few and narrow grounds for our courts to refuse to
enforce (or vacate) arbitral awards, and our courts generally demonstrate
substantial deference to arbitrators’ decision-making (even when—or per-
haps because—in many contexts, there is no requirement that arbitrators
provide an opinion to explain the reasoning underlying their arbitral
awards).  Thus, the justice delivered by arbitration affects the justice deliv-
ered by our courts.  Sustaining (or regaining) public trust in our courts and
in the reality of statutorily-granted civil rights depends, at least in part, upon
our courts demanding that arbitration, arbitrators, and institutional arbitral
providers demonstrate their quality and fairness.
Now the essay will turn to the principles that should guide DSD in
order to determine their incorporation into the development of the system of
class action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration described in Judge
Pauley’s opinion.
B. Considering the Principles That Should Guide Dispute System
Design
1. Determination of Whether ADR Is Appropriate
There are many ways in which arbitration appears to be a very appro-
priate means to resolve disputes between consumers and credit card issuers.
Most of these disputes likely involve small amounts of money and rela-
tively straightforward factual determinations regarding purchases, delivery,
quality of the products or services, payments, and written disclosures.
These disputes likely would benefit from a process that permits prompt and
inexpensive factual determinations and judgments.  Arbitrators, meanwhile,
may be able to devote more time to each case than judges can afford.  Arbi-
trators with specialized expertise may even be better equipped than general-
ist judges to require parties to submit all necessary documentation and
determine whether claims are barred by statutes of limitations, regardless of
whether these defenses are raised by consumers.
156. See id. at 197 (“Authorizing corporations to shape and fund a national small claims court
through which consumers must navigate before they may access public courts, and then limiting
such access to deferential judicial review, invites both the perception and the reality of a system
that is beset by structural bias.  Such perceptions then endanger the public’s perception of the
courts as a place where they can trust that they will experience justice.”); Welsh, I Could Have
Been a Contender, supra note 6, at 1153–57 (describing the overlap between, and mutual effects
upon, the private risk management system and the public justice system); Welsh, What Is
“(Im)Partial Enough”, supra note 119, at 401–05, 433–41, 465–67 (applying Caperton’s analysis
of the constitutional due process limits on an adjudicator’s potential for bias to NAF’s individual
arbitrators and NAF as an institution); Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation
in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 129–32 (2004) (focusing on
arbitration and referring to arbitrators as “adjuncts of the judicial system”).
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Other disputes between consumers and credit card issuers, however,
might not be appropriate for this sort of expedited and individualized fac-
tual determination and judgment.  As Jean Sternlight has written, consum-
ers might not even realize that they have certain statutory claims or claims
for hidden charges—and thus would be unlikely to bring them individu-
ally.157 In addition, some claims may be too small even to justify the ex-
pense of individual arbitration.158  These sorts of claims will require an
aggregated process rather than an individualized one.  One such aggregated
process, of course, is the class action.
2. Development of a System that is Fair and Just
Judge Pauley’s opinion reveals that some participants in the meetings
of the Arbitration Coalition advocated for ensuring the fairness of any
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration system.159  In addition, the Consumer
Due Process Protocol included several provisions designed to enhance both
substantive and procedural fairness.
It is not at all clear, however, that all of the lawyers, dispute resolution
professionals, or representatives of the credit card issuers involved in devel-
oping the arbitration system were focused on fairness or were aware of the
Protocol and committed to incorporating its principles into the new system.
Indeed, it is striking that in-house counsel at Discover, who appears to have
been one of the strongest proponents for developing a fair dispute system,
apparently was not invited to participate in the teleconferences of the In-
House Counsel Working Group.  In addition, even though the Protocol in-
cludes many provisions designed to enhance fairness, it does not make any
specific reference to the fairness or unfairness of depriving consumers of
their right to participate in class actions.
3. Providing Multiple Process Options for Parties, Including
Rights-Based and Interest-Based Processes
The focus of the new dispute system described in Judge Pauley’s opin-
ion was arbitration, and only arbitration.  There were not multiple process
options.  Rather, the goal was to limit consumers to this single process op-
tion, and it was rights-based—just like the class actions and individual legal
actions it was designed to replace.  Even if the credit card issuers’ contracts
permitted consumers to bring actions in small claims court pursuant to the
Consumer Due Process Protocol, this just represented another adjudicative,
rights-based option.
157. See Sternlight, supra note 125, at 87, 111–19 (discussing “procedurally difficult” claims).
158. See id. at 114.
159. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 439.
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As noted supra, the Due Process Protocol also encourages the use of
mediation.  However, Judge Pauley’s opinion suggests that there was never
any discussion of this lone interest-based process.
4. Providing Parties with the Ability to “Loop Back” and “Loop
Forward” Among Options
Because the primary aim of the arbitration system was to remove the
class action option and replace it with arbitration, this new dispute system
did not provide parties with the ability to “loop back” or “loop forward”
among options.
5. Providing Substantial Stakeholder Involvement in System’s
Design
Because there were no consumers, no representatives of consumer or-
ganizations, and no representatives of responsible regulatory or governmen-
tal agencies involved in this system’s development, very important interests
were missing entirely.  Meanwhile, of course, the credit card issuers had
very substantial involvement in the development of the system.
6. Participation that is Voluntary, Confidential, and Assisted by
Impartial Third Party Neutrals
Because the new dispute system was imposed upon consumers as a
condition of entering into contracts with the credit card issuers, there was
no opportunity for voluntary participation.  Meanwhile, because the credit
card issuers chose the particular dispute resolution organizations included in
their contracts, consumers could reasonably fear that the pool of arbitrators
might not be entirely impartial.160
7. System Transparency and Accountability
There was no provision for system transparency and accountability.
8. Education and Training of Stakeholders on the Use of Available
Process Options
There is no indication that the credit card issuers provided education
and training of consumers, consumer organizations, or any others on the use
of the new arbitration system.
160. See generally, Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough,” supra note 119.
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9. Interim Conclusion Regarding the Principles That Should Guide
Dispute System Design
Even if the mandatory arbitration system developed by the credit card
issuers represents a DSD, it fulfills very few of the principles now identified
as essential by system design experts.  If the lawyers or the dispute resolu-
tion professionals truly had played a design role, they might have proceeded
in a manner more likely to yield a DSD that would be fair, would be per-
ceived as fair, and would be sustainable on its own.  There would be much
less need for frequent resort to the courts for assistance with the enforce-
ment of agreements and awards.
V. THE ROLE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION ORGANIZATIONS AND
PROFESSIONALS IN THE NEXT PHASE OF
DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN
In the years since 2003, the use of mandatory pre-dispute consumer
arbitration clauses has expanded dramatically.  According to the CFPB,
“[t]ens of millions of consumers [now] use consumer financial products or
services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses.”161  Seventy-five
percent of the largest credit card-issuing banks include arbitration agree-
ments in their contracts with consumers; the same is true for 42% of the
smaller and mid-sized credit card-issuing banks.162  As a result, 53% of the
consumer contracts in the credit card market include arbitration clauses
(and that percentage would be 94% but for a settlement that the plaintiffs
reached with some of the defendant banks in Ross).163  The percentages of
market penetration are even higher in many other consumer product mar-
kets.  The CFPB sampled prepaid card agreements, for example, and found
that 92% of them required the use of arbitration.  For a sample of storefront
payday loan agreements (from California and Texas), 99% included an arbi-
tration clause.164  The same was true for 99% of the consumer contracts in
the mobile wireless market.165 All of the large providers of payday loans
include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts; 84% of a sample of
smaller lenders also do so.166
Much also remains the same.  Courts generally enforce the arbitration
provisions, as well as class action waivers.  Credit card issuers continue to
select the dispute resolution organizations that will provide the arbitrations.
161. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 147, at § 1.4.1.
162. Id. at § 2.3.1.
163. Id.
164. Id. at § 2.3.4. See, e.g., James v. Nat’l Fin., LLC, 132 A.3d 799 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding
that a payday loan of $200.00 with an APR of 838.45% was unconscionable; also noting that the
court had granted Rule 11 sanctions because the company had attempted to compel arbitration
even though it knew the consumer had opted out of the arbitration provision).
165. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 147, at § 2.3.6.
166. Id. at § 2.5.2.
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There is no transparency or accountability to consumers, except as required
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) for the arbitra-
tion of securities disputes between and among investors, brokerage firms
and individual brokers, and in California, Maine, Maryland and the District
of Columbia.167
But change may be in the air.  General Mills experimented with the
imposition of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration upon consumers accessing
the company’s online services.168  The severity of the consumer backlash
led to General Mills’ withdrawal of its provision.169  As noted in the intro-
duction supra, the opponents of class action-barring arbitration clauses have
mounted a significant offensive that appears designed to make arbitration
salient to consumers.  The Alliance for Justice produced a video, Lost in the
Fine Print, that is available online.170  The New York Times published a
series of articles that focused on individual horror stories as employees,
consumers, and parents of patients dealt with the adverse effects of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration.171  The New York Times editorial
board172 and Consumer Reports173 have both warned about the perils of
class action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
Some dispute resolution professionals have responded with criticisms
of the emotional and one-sided character of these attacks on arbitration.
They point out the many potential advantages of arbitration for consumers,
167. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015); D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (2008);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 10, § 1394 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West 2011). See
also Resnik, supra note 125, at 2896–900 (describing various disclosure requirements); Letter of
Nancy A. Welsh, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, to Monica Jackson (July 29,
2016) (on file with author) (regarding Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Proposed Rule on
Arbitration Agreements) (examining and contrasting the disclosure requirements of, and
searchability of public information for, FINRA, California, Maine, Maryland and the District of
Columbia in some detail).
168. See Gregory Wallace, General Mills Reverses Course on Right to Sue After Backlash,
CNN (Apr. 20, 2014, 1:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/20/news/companies/general-mills-
backlash/; Kirstie Foster, We’ve Listened – and We’re Changing Our Legal Terms Back, GENER-
ALMILLS.COM (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listened-and-
were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were/.
169. Id.
170. Lost in the Fine Print 2014, supra note 2.
171. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0; Jessica Silver-Green-
berg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-
the-justice-system.html; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration,
Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/
business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html.
172. The Editorial Board, Arbitrating Disputes, Denying Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/arbitrating-disputes-denying-justice.html.
173. Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many Consumer Contracts, CON-
SUMER REPORTS (last updated Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/shopping/the-
arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-contracts.
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including the expertise and professionalism of the arbitrators, the speed and
reduced cost of the process, and the benefits of certainty.174  Notably, some
of these commentators have also acknowledged the need for reforms to
arbitration.175
Other dispute resolution professionals and entrepreneurs have focused
their attention on creating alternatives to consumer arbitration—generally
online methods of dispute resolution (“ODR”) that are suited to the han-
dling of small claims and likely to be more easily accessible than in-person
courts or other tribunals.176  Indeed, the European Union is now requiring
businesses to inform consumers about the availability of these sorts of on-
line options with the hope that both businesses and consumers will elect to
use them.177  Canadian and Dutch courts are beginning to use ODR and are
introducing their innovations to other courts.178  The UK’s courts have an-
nounced their intention to adopt ODR.179  New York’s state courts, in part-
nership with the American Bar Association, are exploring the use of court-
connected online dispute resolution to resolve debt collection matters.180
This essay will return to the intriguing potential of ODR infra.
174. See, e.g., David B. Lipsky, The New York Times’ Attack on Arbitration, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Summer 2016, at 6; Lisa Renee Pomerantz, Consumer Arbitration: Pre-Dispute Resolution
Clauses and Class Action Waivers, ACRESOLUTION, Fall 2015, at 16.
175. See Lipsky, supra note 174, at 10 (recalling proposal to amend the FAA to require funda-
mental due process protections similar to those contained in the Consumer Due Process Protocol).
176. See generally Louis F. Del Duca, Colin Rule & Brian Cressman, Lessons and Best Prac-
tices for Designers of Fast Track, Low Value, High Volume Global E-Commerce ODR Systems, 4
PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 242 (2015); Louis F. Del Duca, Colin Rule & Kathryn Rimpfel,
Ebay’s De Facto Low Value High Volume Resolution Process: Lessons and Best Practices for
ODR Systems Designers, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 204 (2014); Louis Del Duca, Colin Rule
& Zbynek Loebl, Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce—Developing a Global
Online Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR Systems—Work of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), 1 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 59
(2012).
177. See Pablo Cortes, The Brave New World of Consumer Redress in the EU and the UK, 22
No. 3 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 41. (2016) (describing the effects of Directive 2013/11/EU on Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution (ADR) for Consumer Disputes and Regulation 524/2013 on Online Dis-
pute Resolution (ODR) for Consumer Disputes, effective July 2015 and January 2016
respectively).  The EU, unlike the U.S., does not enforce mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses
against consumers.
178. See HIIL, HIIL TREND REPORT IV: ODR AND THE COURTS: THE PROMISE OF 100% AC-
CESS TO JUSTICE?, 35,39 (Hiil 2016), http://www.onlineresolution.com/hiil.pdf.
179. See LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, JUDICIARY ENG. & WALES, CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE RE-
VIEW: FINAL REPORT 36–64 (July 2016), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/
07/civil-courts-structure-review-final-report-jul-16-final-1.pdf (regarding online court); LORD
CHANCELLOR, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TRANSFORMING OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (Sept. 2016) https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint-vision-state-
ment.pdf; LORD CHANCELLOR & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, MINISTRY OF J., TRANSFORM-
ING OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF REFORMS AND CONSULTATION 13–17 (Sept. 2016), https:/
/consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/transforming-our-courts-and-tribunals/supporting_
documents/consultationpaper.pdf.
180. See SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION,
FUND FOR JUSTICE & EDUCATION, SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW, COMMISSION IN THE
FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES, EXPANDING ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES THROUGH THE ADVANCE-
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Probably the most significant development, though, was passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, giving authority to the CFPB to issue regulations
that would “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations” on mandatory pre-
dispute consumer arbitration clauses in contracts for financial products or
services as long as the CFPB found that doing so was “in the public interest
and for the protection of consumers.”181  The Act also required the CFPB to
conduct a study of mandatory arbitration and its regulatory findings had to
be consistent with the study.182  The CFPB has conducted this empirical
study and has issued its report.  Among other things, the CFPB looked for
evidence that the inclusion of arbitration agreements led to lower prices for
consumers (or, conversely, that the elimination of arbitration agreements
led to higher prices for consumers).  The CFPB concluded that there was no
evidence of any such effect.183  The CFPB also found that class actions
were more likely to precede government enforcement actions184 and
benefitted consumer members of the class.185
The agency proposed new regulations in May, 2016.186  The CFPB’s
first proposed rule would bar providers of consumer financial products and
services (in the markets of lending money, storing money, and moving or
exchanging money) from including class action waivers in their pre-dispute
arbitration clauses and would require the providers to disclose in their arbi-
tration clauses that consumers may participate in class actions.187  The
MENT OF COURT-ANNEXED ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ENTERPRISE FUND APPLICATION
(FEBRUARY 19, 2016).
181. 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012).
182. Id.
183. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 147, at § 10.3.
184. Id. at § 9.1 (“When we did find overlapping activity by government entities and private
class action lawyers, public enforcement activity was preceded by private activity 71% of the
time. In contrast, private class action complaints were preceded by public enforcement activity
36% of the time.”).
185. Id. at § 1.4.7 (describing monetary relief provided to class members and noting that “a
number of settlements also required companies to change business practices”).
186. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements, 81
Fed. Reg. 32830 (proposed May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.R.F. pt. 1040) [hereinafter
Arbitration Agreements].  The CFPB first submitted tentative proposed rules to a Small Business
Review Panel. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUS. ADVISORY REV. PANEL FOR PO-
TENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER CONSIDER-
ATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 17 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_
cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explaining-the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf.
187. Id. at 32888. Specifically, proposed §1040.4(a) would provide:
(1) General rule. A provider shall not seek to rely in any way on a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement entered into after the date set forth in § 1040.5(a) with respect to any
aspect of a class action that is related to any of the consumer financial products or
services covered by § 1040.3 including to seek a stay or dismissal of particular claims or
the entire action, unless and until the presiding court has ruled that the case may not
proceed as a class action and, if that ruling may be subject to appellate review on an
interlocutory basis, the time to seek such review has elapsed or the review has been
resolved.
(2) Provision required in covered pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Upon entering
into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement for a product or service covered by § 1040.3
after the date set forth in § 1040.5(a):
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CFPB’s second proposed rule would require the providers of consumer fi-
nancial products and services to report to the CFPB regarding both their use
of arbitration conducted pursuant to mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbi-
tration clauses and the outcomes of such arbitrations.188  The CFPB ex-
plains that it “intends to use the information it collects to continue
monitoring arbitral proceedings to determine whether there are develop-
ments that raise consumer protection concerns that may warrant further Bu-
reau action.”189 The CFPB also proposes to publish these materials on its
(i) Except as provided in paragraphs (a)(2)(ii) or (iii) of this section or in
§ 1040.5(a), a provider shall ensure that the agreement contains the following provi-
sion: “We agree that neither we nor anyone else will use this agreement to stop you
from being part of a class action case in court. You may file a class action in court
or you may be a member of a class action even if you do not file it.”
(ii) When the pre-dispute arbitration agreement is for multiple products or services,
only some of which are covered by § 1040.3, the provider may include the follow-
ing alternative provision in place of the one otherwise required by paragraph
4(a)(2)(i) of this section: “We are providing you with more than one product or
service, only some of which are covered by the Arbitration Agreements Rule issued
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. We agree that neither we nor anyone
else will use this agreement to stop you from being part of a class 362 action case in
court. You may file a class action in court or you may be a member of a class action
even if you do not file it. This provision applies only to class action claims concern-
ing the products or services covered by that Rule.”
(iii) When the pre-dispute arbitration agreement existed previously between other
parties and does not contain either the provision required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of
this section or the alternative permitted by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section, the
provider shall either ensure the agreement is amended to contain the provision spec-
ified in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(A) of this section or provide any consumer to whom the
agreement applies with the written notice specified in paragraph (a)(2)(iii)(B) of this
section. The provider shall ensure the agreement is amended or provide the notice to
consumers within 60 days of entering into the pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
(A) Agreement provision. “We agree that neither we nor anyone else who later
becomes a party to this pre-dispute arbitration agreement will use it to stop you
from being part of a class action case in court. You may file a class action in
court or you may be a member of a class action even if you do not file it.”
(B) Notice. “We agree not to use any pre-dispute arbitration agreement to stop
you from being part of a class action case in court. You may file a class action
in court or you may be a member of a class action even if you do not file it.”
See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUS. ADVISORY REV. PANEL, supra note 168, at
17 (tentatively proposing that “any arbitration agreement included in a contract for a consumer
financial product or service . . . [be] inapplicable to cases filed in court on behalf of a class . . . “);
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 129, at § 1.4.4 (specifically referencing class action in court).
188. More specifically, the rule requires submission of five types of documents, with redaction
of individual names and other specified information: (1) the initial claim (whether filed by a
consumer or by the provider) and any counterclaim; (2) the pre-dispute arbitration agreement filed
with the arbitrator or arbitration administrator; (3) the award, if any, issued by the arbitrator or
arbitration administrator; (4) any communications from the arbitrator or arbitration administrator
with whom the claim was filed relating to a refusal to administer or dismissal of a claim due to the
provider’s failure to pay required fees; and (5) any communications related to a determination that
an arbitration agreement does not comply with the administrator’s fairness principles. See Arbitra-
tion Agreements, supra note, 186, at 32868; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUS.
ADVISORY REV. PANEL, supra note 186, at 13–14, 20 (tentatively proposing a very similar report-
ing requirement).
189. Arbitration Agreements, supra note 186, at 32888.
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website in some form, with appropriate redaction or aggregation.190  With
this second proposed rule, the CFPB would dramatically increase the trans-
parency of the consumer arbitration process in the context of financial ser-
vices and products.
Since the CFPB began its research and release of tentative and then
final proposed rules, some dispute resolution professionals have become
willing to acknowledge that class action waivers make them uneasy and that
they are concerned that arbitration’s association with class action waivers is
undermining arbitration’s legitimacy with the general public.191  Indeed, af-
ter the CFPB released its tentative proposals, the ABA Section of Dispute
Resolution again weighed the possibility of adding its voice and expertise to
the public debate.  The Section’s Council charged a “CFPB Review Task
Force” to provide its recommendations regarding whether and how to re-
spond to the CFPB’s tentative proposals.
That Task Force, consisting of both dispute resolution professionals
and academics,192 advised the Section to support the CFPB’s proposals.
Importantly, the Task Force explained that its endorsement of the proposal
to bar class action waivers did not represent “a statement that class action
litigation is a preferred, or even adequate, method of vindicating individual
consumers’ financial interests” and noted instead that “the Task Force
members hold mixed views on the efficacy of consumer class actions.”193
Despite the Task Force members’ diverging views on class actions, how-
ever, they all agreed on the value of the bar on class action waivers in order
to “protect the integrity of the arbitration process.”  The Task Force also
concluded that “a financial consumer’s agreement to privately arbitrate,
rather than publicly litigate, consumer claims should not be entwined with a
separate agreement to waive the protections provided by F.C.R.P. 23, or by
class-wide procedures of private providers of arbitration servicers.”194  In-
terestingly, the Task Force even referenced ODR, noting: “Moreover, the
Task Force is unanimously supportive of the development of technologies –
some of which already exist—that might allow the resolution of small-
value, large-volume consumer claims using more just, more consensual and
more efficient processes than individual or class-wide litigation or arbitra-
tion may provide.”195  Regarding the CFPB’s second proposal to require
reporting of (and make public) arbitral filings and awards, the Task Force
190. Id.; CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUS. ADVISORY REV. PANEL, supra note 186,
at 20.
191. See, e.g., CFPB REVIEW TASK FORCE Report to the Council of the Dispute Resolution
Section (on file with author).
192. The CFPB Review Task Force consisted of: Nancy Welsh (Chair), Lisa Amsler, Louis
Burke, Ben Davis, Homer Larue, Bruce Meyerson, Lawrence Mills, Peter Phillips, Colin Rule,
Jean Sternlight, Thomas Stipanowich, and Beth Trent. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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found it to be “generally uncontroversial” and although “a few Task Force
members raised potential concerns about confidentiality, generally all felt
that more data in this area is welcome.”196  Thus, focusing on the integrity
of the arbitration process led the Task Force to recommend that the Dispute
Resolution Section support the ban on class action waivers and the require-
ment of increased transparency.197
The Section’s Council subsequently engaged in extensive and thought-
ful deliberation.  Ultimately, and pursuant to Council direction, the Section
sought and won permission from the ABA (through its “blanket authority”
procedure) to submit comments to the CFPB.  In these comments, the Sec-
tion expressed strong support for the CFPB’s second proposal requiring
providers to report arbitration claim filings, pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, awards, and communications regarding compliance with fairness
principles and payment requirements, and to make such information public
after appropriate aggregation or redaction.  The Section reviewed the expe-
rience of quasi-public dispute resolution organizations, private organiza-
tions, states and the District of Columbia with the collection and publication
of arbitration-related information, concluding that such experience revealed
the need for disclosure of specific information and that the resulting trans-
parency was valuable.  The Section observed that:
. . .the reporting and publication proposed by the CFPB—and the
consequent availability of the information for those participating
in consumer arbitration, those researching consumer arbitration,
and those overseeing consumer arbitration—will help to protect
the integrity of arbitration and, by extension, the integrity of the
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration that has been ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court.198
Regarding the CFPB’s first proposal, barring class action waivers, the
Section consulted with other dispute resolution organizations and ABA sec-
tions, ultimately concluding that: 1) it was unlikely that the Section could
win blanket authority to submit comments on this topic and 2) it was prefer-
able to work with stakeholders to explore the development of a “third
way”—i.e., a dispute resolution option that would improve upon the current
state of both mandatory pre-dispute arbitration and class actions for con-
sumers of financial products and services.199
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Letter from Nancy A. Welsh, Chair-Elect, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, to
Monica Jackson, Office of the Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (July
29, 2016) (on file with author) (regarding Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Proposed
Rule on Arbitration Agreements).
199. See Draft Minutes of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Council Meeting of April 6,
2016 in New York, ABA SEC. DISP. RESOL., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ad-
ministrative/dispute_resolution/leadership/Council_Book_Annual_2016.authcheckdam.pdf (dis-
cussing whether or not to support CFPB proposed rules); Minutes of the ABA Section of Dispute
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Thus, the announcement of the CFPB’s proposed rules created another
opportunity to engage in DSD—but intentionally, thoughtfully, with full
stakeholder representation, and in a manner consistent with the principles
outlined by Amsler, Martinez, and Smith.  The CFPB Review Task Force’s
report and recommendation seeded suggestions regarding an expanded set
of dispute resolution options when it referenced “technologies – some of
which already exist – that might allow the resolution of small-value, large-
volume consumer claims using more just, more consensual and more effi-
cient processes than individual or class-wide litigation or arbitration may
provide.”200  The Section’s Council similarly identified ODR as a poten-
tially fruitful “third way.”  Such online options could be interest-based,
rather than rights-based.  They could offer opportunities for “looping back”
and “looping forward.”  They could ensure that consumers have access to
information about their rights and defenses201 and that such information
could be delivered in a manner that is both respectful and engagingly inter-
active.202  These ODR procedures could be made transparent and accounta-
ble, with required reporting regarding: the number of consumers who use
them; the number of consumers who proceed to mediation, arbitration,
small claims court, or other procedural options; consumers’ perceptions of
the options’ procedural fairness; and their substantive results.203
Imagine that a healthy majority of a company’s consumers use such
online processes, and they report that they find the processes effective and
Resolution Council Meeting, August 6, 2016, San Francisco, ABA SEC. DISP. RESOL.(2016), http:/
/www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/environment_energy_resources/council_
meetings/2016_summer_council_agenda_materials.authcheckdam.pdf (approval of April 6, 2016
minutes).
200. CFPB REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 191.
201. Such information could alert consumers who are confronting frivolous lawsuits for the
collection of time-barred (or “zombie”) debt. See David Luban, Optimism, Skepticism, and Access
to Justice, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 495, 497 (2016).
202. Such interactions could be structured to be consistent with the socio-psychological litera-
ture regarding procedural justice.  Designers also will need to be mindful of the need for substan-
tive and procedural safeguards. See Nancy A. Welsh, Professor of Law, Penn State University,
Dickinson School of Law, ODR: A time for celebration and the embrace of procedural safeguards
at the 2016 International Forum for Online Dispute Resolution (May 2016), The Hague (transcript
available at www.adrhub.com/profiles/blogs/procedural-justice-in-odr).
203. See id. (also calling for algorithmic audits and alternative forums for those who do not
have access to, or facility with, online options); see generally Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow,
No Sheriff in Town: Governance for Online Dispute Resolution, 32 NEG. J. (forthcoming 2016);
Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow, Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute Resolution, 36
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 143 (2015); Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Digital Justice:
Reshaping Boundaries in an Online Dispute Resolution Environment, 1 INT’L J. OF ONLINE DISP.
RESOL. 5, 28 (2014); Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J. Shackelford, Technology, Ethics, and
Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 485 (2014);
Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from “Have-
Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411 (2014); Suzanne Van Arsdale, User Protections in Online
Dispute Resolution, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 107, 128–29 (2015); Carrie Menkel-Meadow &
Robert Dingwall, Negotiating with Scripts and Playbooks: What to Do When Big Bad Companies
Won’t Negotiate (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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fair.  Imagine that regulators put into place substantive and procedural safe-
guards and find that the processes produce fair results, with impressive
compliance by both companies and consumers.  Consumers will then have
the “practical ability” to “pursue their claims” individually (quoting from
the 1996 proposed revisions to Rule 23 that were abandoned).204 They will
not need class certification in order to gain redress.  They will have the
motivation and ability to bring their own individual claims.  Class actions
will remain available, certainly, but for the more limited set of claims that
really require access to such a procedural device.205  If the CFPB promul-
gates its proposed rules (which admittedly appears increasingly unlikely in
light of the November 2016 election and subsequent developments), the
agency might even be willing to permit a regulated provider to overcome
the bar on class action waivers, provided that the provider made a suffi-
ciently persuasive initial showing and also met its obligation to continue to
engage in rigorous monitoring and reporting.206
If such a dispute system is possible, who can and should serve as its
designers?  Recall that from 1997 to 2003, in-house counsel and outside
counsel—and to a much lesser extent, representatives of dispute resolution
organizations—jumpstarted an ad hoc DSD process.  They failed to address
many of the questions or principles that we now know should have been
considered.  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they (and their em-
ployers) acted in anticipation of the roles they could play in any system they
designed.  They were stakeholders, not impartial designers trying to create a
system that would meet the most important interests of all of those involved
in the system.  Thus, they suffered from a conflict of interest—in much the
same way that an accounting firm may suffer from a conflict of interest
when it provides both business consulting and auditing services to the same
client.  There is no need to repeat that entirely predictable mistake.  The
ultimate decision-maker in the design of a new system should not be one of
the stakeholders, but a neutral third party.
204. 167 F.R.D. 523, 559.
205. This analysis presumes that the CFPB will be successful in establishing a complete bar
on class action waivers—which would then incentivize companies to explore alternative dispute
resolution processes (e.g., online procedures, ombuds) that would help them avoid class certifica-
tion. See Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, supra note 143, at 203, 216–28
(regarding potential use of ombuds, as well as other means companies could use to demonstrate
the fairness of their arbitration programs despite their potential to be subject to structural bias);
Rick Bales, Is Mandatory Arbitration Bad for Business, LPB NETWORK (Feb. 20, 2016), http://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2016/02/is-mandatory-arbitration-bad-for-business
.html (“I think a good case can be made that SCOTUS’s pro-arbitration line of cases—especially
those that all but extinguish consumer class actions—have removed the incentive for American
companies to invest in developing effective dispute-resolution programs.  As a result, American
companies risk falling yet farther behind their European competitors.”).
206. This suggests that the CFPB could make its bar on class action waivers strongly pre-
sumptive, permitting regulated parties to apply to overcome such presumption by making the
necessary showings regarding the accessibility, extent of use and fairness (both procedural and
substantive) of their alternative online systems. See also STIPANOWICH ET AL., supra note 72.
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CONCLUSION
Based on Judge Pauley’s opinion in Ross v. Am. Express Co., it ap-
pears that a private, ad hoc DSD process did lead to the dominance of class
action-barring mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the contracts be-
tween credit card issuers and consumers.  In-house counsel and outside
counsel played key roles in initiating this process, but it is unclear that any
particular individuals could claim credit (or responsibility) as “designers.”
The representatives of dispute resolution organizations, meanwhile, played
supporting roles—as providers of general information about their services,
cross-fertilizers, and amici.  Neither the lawyers nor the dispute resolution
professionals addressed the issues or principles that DSD experts now
recommend.
Dispute resolution professionals could—and perhaps should—have
played a more significant design role.  The AAA, for example, was remark-
ably successful in gathering together a diverse set of stakeholders and de-
veloping a responsive Consumer Due Process Protocol.  It does not appear,
however, that the AAA was invited into the DSD process that led to class
action-barring arbitration clauses, at least not explicitly.  One can only spec-
ulate why this was so.  The ABA, meanwhile, appeared poised to play a
role—but the Dispute Resolution Section’s Task Force was unable to
achieve the necessary consensus to move forward.207
Ultimately, it appears that the dispute resolution professionals who
could have played a more significant design role viewed themselves prima-
rily as vendors, or they were not invited to play a design role, or they were
stymied by their identity as membership organizations and their commit-
ment to consensus.
Through its research and proposed rulemaking, the CFPB has opened
up another opportunity for dispute resolution professionals to play a role in
designing a system for the resolution of disputes between consumers and
providers of financial services and products.  Before the November 2016
election, it appeared that this design effort had the potential to be quite
different from what occurred between 1997 and 2003. Only stakeholders—
and, frankly, only a subset of the stakeholders—were involved in that ef-
fort.  The CFPB, in contrast, is a third party and was poised to be the ulti-
mate decision-maker regarding dispute system design.208  The agency
appeared to have a strong interest in creating a dispute system that was—in
reality and in appearance—effective, fair, and worthy of trust for consum-
207. It is at least interesting that Alan Kaplinsky, a key player in the development of class
action-barring arbitration clauses, was also an active participant in the Task Force’s deliberations.
208. See Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice, supra note 31, at 7 (pointing out
the importance of design by a third party, rather than one of the disputing parties).  I am aware that
there are those who do not perceive the CFPB as a disinterested third party, but the history of
administrative law suggests that the agency has achieved, or will achieve, a rough balance in
response to its various constituents—or at the very least, a dynamic equilibrium.
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ers, regulated providers and the public generally.  Now, despite all of the
efforts the CFPB directed to this effort, it is not at all clear that it will
proceed with its rulemaking.
Dispute resolution organizations and professionals share the CFPB’s
interest in a dispute system that is effective, fair and worthy of trust by all.
It is exciting to imagine the application of technologies and processes that
were largely unknown in 2003.  But which dispute resolution professionals
can serve as designers of this system?  Obviously, any dispute resolution
organization or individual neutral hoping to receive referrals from repeat
players will be a stakeholder with strong financial and business interests.
Such an organization or neutral should not also be the designer.  The likeli-
hood of self-serving choices, whether made consciously or unconsciously,
is too strong.
So now it is time for a respected dispute resolution organization to step
up.  Ideally, it should be an organization that does not need to rely on refer-
rals or financial support from the repeat players involved in these disputes.
Alternatively, it could be an organization that has demonstrated its trustwor-
thiness regardless of its relationships with repeat players.  In either case,
this organization will need to care deeply about the integrity of the dispute
resolution field and about developing a dispute system that is effective, fair
and worthy of trust.  That means the organization actually will have a stake
in the system—but this is just the sort of stake that would make for the very
best of designers.
